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Abstract	  	  
This thesis critically scrutinise the modern state project in a non-Western Sub-Saharan African setting. 
In order to do so, it applies the case study method and takes as point of departure the embryonic state 
South Sudan, which came into being in 2011. The aim of this dissertation is to understand the processes 
behind the breakdown of the state and nation occurring soon after its independence. It finds that the 
state building project conducted with help from the UN is unable to succeed as it remains one out of 
three ‘logics’ abided on the ground: (1) the nation- state logic, (2) the tribal logic, and (3) the client-
patron network. The conducted political settlement analysis illustrates that rent seeking in and around 
the state dominates and is distributed via patron-client networks. The paper concludes that a 16-month 
halt in oil production from 2012-2013 splintered the economic foundation of the patron-client networks 
and collapsed the clientalistic political settlement and hereby broke down the young state and nation. 
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Prelude 
I apologise in advance for the following disclosures and unmasking of what one can possibly deem 
‘public secrets’. These are the practices we identify but cannot voice, and which exist manifold in 
this case study. The following is not meant to point fingers nor to create enemies. It is meant to 
create a framework in which one can understand and conceptualise the challenges South Sudan are 
confronted with. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Problem area 
The Republic of South Sudan is the world's youngest nation-state, still at an embryonic stage. It was 
shaped by the extensive military and humanitarian struggles between the government of Sudan and 
the Sudan’s People's Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM / A) that reoccurred in 1983 and lasted 
until 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPAs) secured peace in one of Africa’s 
longest civil wars. The CPAs were designed to reunite the parties and to preserve unity of Sudan, 
and had therefore inbuilt a referendum in which the Southerners were meant to approve of unity 
amongst the two. However, on January 9th 2011, 99,57 percent of the Southerners voted for 
secession (Larson, 2013) and the latent yet consistent yearning for separation materialised within a 
half a year. 
 
Upon secession, the nation was in ecstasy and tears were shed as the road to peace, equality and 
development finally was paved. Or so Southerners and the rest of the world expected. As 
exemplified by President Barack Obama in a press release recognising South Sudan as a sovereign 
and independent state on 9th of July 2011: “Today is a reminder that after the darkness of war, the 
light of a new dawn is possible”. He continues, “A proud flag flies over Juba and the map of the 
world has been drawn.” (CNN, 2011). During the federalisation Southern Sudan had been 
politically, socially and economically discarded and consequently, institutions and capacities were 
far from adequate for modern statehood. To assist South Sudan in its intensive nation-state project, 
the UNDP supported and closely cooperated with the newly independent government. 
Subsequently, a Weberian (nation)state defined by its state monopoly on the means of violence and 
territorial control was in the making, and a blueprint for modern statehood was invoked by the 
formal building of modern institutions and democratic government structures. In this thesis I will 
argue that a ‘nation-state logic’ hereby was introduced in addition to the existing rationalities based 
on cultural and ethnic tradition and local distributions custom. Vital in pre as well as post CPA’s is 
the Southerner’s natural resources endowment. This is reflected in government revenue of 2010 in 
which 97,8 percent was derived from the oil industry (SSCCSE, 2011), which at that time made 
South Sudan the most oil dependent country in the world (World Bank, 2014). 
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In retrospect, the dream of a peaceful South Sudan turned out to be short-lived as political crisis in 
the SPLM leadership sparked on December 15th 2013 turned into ethnic violence and transgressed 
into intra-state war. (Johnson, 2014a: Pinaud: 2014: Ronaldsen, 2015) The crisis has proven 
persistent and continues to generate high levels of civilian casualties in terms of numbers of deaths, 
injuries, IDP’s and refugees. As a consequence, South Sudan scores poorer than Somalia and is 
coined “the most fragile state in the world”, as it ranks as number one in the fragile state index of 
2014 and 2015. (FFP, 2015). This thesis sets out to investigate how the dream of modern statehood 
and sovereignty erupted into a nightmare of conflict and violence less than three years after 
claiming independence. 
 
In order to investigate the processes of state building and state fragility, this dissertation follows the 
case study method to comprehend the empirically grounded processes and point towards causal 
relations behind these processes where it is possible. It will also build on extensive historical 
knowledge based on primary and secondary data. The primary data is based on talks during a 10-
day field trip to Juba South Sudan where I interviewed civil servants, politicians, scholars and 
Generals. The secondary data is based on academic material from related fields connected to the 
different areas of the case studied. In order to understand how peace ended and the political 
leadership began to quarrel, two central elements will be studied. First to be studied is the modern 
state project, and second is the political economy of the state. The analysis begins with investigating 
the internally promoted, but also externally imposed state-building project, and contest the blueprint 
‘one size fits all’ version of statehood invoked in South Sudan. It will then problematize the modern 
state project in relation to the pre-existing logic of the clientalist political settlement (which is in 
diametric opposition to the good governance agenda) in order to understand how this challenges the 
livelihood of the new state. The analysis will then inaugurate an investigation of ‘stateness’ and the 
way in which GOSS create and maintain a mythological dimension in order to be coined as an 
imagined community. The second half of the analysis will invoke a political settlement analysis to 
explore the political economy dimension of the young resource endowed state. It will herein 
scrutinise the relations and consequences between the macroeconomic mismanagement and the 
breakdown of the young state. To do so, it investigates the paused oil extractions of the rentier state, 
which basically halted government revenue throughout 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, and took 
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place less than a year before the disequilibrium and collapse of the existing political settlement. The 
paper therefore asks the following: 
 
1.2. Problem definition 
“How can we understand the breakdown of the new South Sudanese state and nation occurring so 
soon after independence?” 
 
1.3. Working questions 
1. How was the state and nation envisioned before and during the second civil war of Sudan by 
the Sudan People Liberation Movement? 
2. How was (nation)state building pursued in South Sudan after the CPA/independence and 
who drove the project and how did the embryonic state fit the idea of the Westphalian state 
imaginary? 
3. How can we understand the role natural resources played in the breakdown of the South 
Sudanese nation-state project after independence? 
 
1.5. Concept clarification and delimitation 
This paper acknowledges that people are sensitive to the word ‘tribe’ and ‘tribal’. It is applied in 
this paper as a substitute for ethnicity and ethnic belonging due to its short explanatory effect, and 
not meant to point towards any negative connotation or colonial history. Also, it is taken for granted 
that the ‘modern state project’ consists of democratic aspirations, which this dissertation delimits 
itself from investigating further. 
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1.4. Outline of chapters 	  	  
Chapter 2: Methodology: this Chapter describes the research design of this Master Thesis. It details 
the case study method, theory on science, the methodological procedures and ethical 
considerations concerning my data collection in the field and provides a presentation of 
my interviewees. 
Chapter 3: Analytical framework: will introduce the theoretical explanations of (1) the development 
of the state and nation, the differences between advanced and developing states, and   
and state building of the modern state project, and (2) explanations of the political 
economy of South Sudan, focusing on macroeconomic challenges of resource 
endowment followed by a presentation of the political settlement approach. 
Chapter 4: Historical background: offers an introduction to the central historical elements of the 
young state and nation. It additionally provides insights of the political visions prior to 
independence, and thus paves to way for the forthcoming analysis and discussions. 
Chapter 5: Analysis one – The modern state project in South Sudan: investigates the attempted state 
building project in South Sudan. It investigates ‘stateness’ and the contradictory logics 
present in the young state, and elaborates on how this hampers the inaugurated state 
building. 
Chapter 6: Analysis two – Patronage and clientalist networks in South Sudan, building on Chapter 
five, the Chapter explains how and why macro economic instability and insufficiency 
has effected the existing political settlement and played a crucial role in the intra-state 
war of the young sovereign. 
Chapter 7: Concluding discussion: the final Chapter elaborates some of the ideas, consequences and 
paradoxes previously studied, and takes up additional relevant conceptualisations before 
I begin the conclusion of the paper. 
  
	   	   	  	  
	   9	  
Chapter 2. Methodology  
 
The coming Chapter will outline the research design of the dissertation and explain how it is carried 
out. It will illuminate the chosen methodology and theory of science and go into depth with the 
extended case study method and qualitative methodological approach. It will argue that I apply 
primary data in form of qualitative interviews and secondary data in form of country reports, 
academic research and statistics of the country of inquiry. The combination of primary and 
secondary data allowed me to get a fuller comprehension of my case study armchair anthropology. 
Chapter two consists of the subchapters ‘Case study methodology’, ‘A personal note’, and 
‘Methodological considerations and ethical considerations’. 
 
 
2.1. Case study methodology 
The case study method is applied in this Global Studies dissertation in order to anchor the global in 
the local. This reflects Max Gluckman who argued: 
 
“Many of the problems that are emerging, and involve the basic problems of endurance, 
stability and different type of change in a social system existing in a space-time can only 
by tackled through the use of the extended-case-study method.“ (Gluckman, 1959: 20-
21). 
 
Gluckman adds that ethnographic data is an apt illustration for its appropriateness of the point. 
Nevertheless, the case study method has been criticised for being unscientific and unable to create 
theory, reliability and validity (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 04). Flyvbjerg repudiates these claims and 
encourages the use of case studies in social science: 
 
“Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. 
Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search 
for predictive theories and universals” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 07). 
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In conclusion, it is maintained that formal generalisations are overestimated sources whereas the 
example is undervalued. Expertise is defined as knowledge of concrete cases, and as the case study 
limits distance to the object of study it increases the academic outcomes, and is less prone to 
researcher’s bias than other methods (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
 
Central for a strong case study analysis is a clear defined unit of analysis, and a declaration of ‘of 
what is this a case’ (Lund, 2014; Yin, 2003). To ease the process of research the unit of analysis 
should be defined as early as possible. I have therefore given this a lot of thought throughout the 
process: of what is this dissertation a case? How does this case study produce knowledge? And 
finally, how can we use it in future research as well as in the field? I have concluded that this is a 
case of two things that can be seen individually and combined, as reflected in my two distinguished 
yet closely related units of analysis, Chapter five and Chapter six. (1) As reflected in Chapter 5, this 
dissertation is a case of contemporary state building and induction of ‘the modern state project’ in a 
post-colonial SSA setting. It takes South Sudan as its point of departure because it as the youngest 
state in the world needed to build up a modern state in a very short time, and therefore portrays the 
project and its consequences clearly. This unit of analysis therefore first and foremost investigates 
outcomes and consequences of the state project installed in a non-European setting. Chapter five 
theorise and generalise from a case and is therefore conducted via inductive reasoning. (2), As 
reflected in Chapter 6, this paper can also be taken as an investigation of the challenges connected 
to the resource endowed developing states. Chapter six takes its point of departure in Political 
Settlement Approach, which draws assumptions about the social world and is therefore deductive. 
Nevertheless, the case study is first and foremost a combination of the two units of analysis, and 
thus is a case investigating the modern state project in a SSA and resource endowed developing 
country. In sum, this paper applies inductive as well as deductive methods in its conceptualisation 
of the case study. 
 
Data for this case study research consists of evidence collected in the form of documents, 
interviews and observation of being presence in the field, combined with large amounts of 
secondary data. Since no methodological procedure is flawless, each of the chosen methods has 
strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, the multiple sources of evidence allow for a data 
triangulation. The thesis was launched on the foundation of extensive historical knowledge of the 
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nation and process of independence. However to verify data reliability and validity the thesis makes 
use of data-triangulation. In relation to the conducted interviews it does so by interviewing different 
educated and knowledgeable persons in different positions, which allows me to cross check 
information. This is then compared and contrasted to related documents and my personal 
experiences by being present in the field, where I observed the social process and disputing logics 
in action. Finally, the results of the later methods were again compared and contrasted to secondary 
scholarly data from various related fields. Data triangulation thus helped to reduce my own and 
other’s subjectivity of the collected information in my production of evidence for the case study. 
 
Social science differs from natural science, as it is historical and thus neither objective nor 
unequivocal. Instead, definitions and concepts frame the field of inquiry, and so the social science 
researcher puts on glasses through which she sees the world from the very beginning of conducting 
a study (Lund, 2014: 225-226). Hereby, social science discovers “Connections and relations, not 
directly observable, by which we can understand and explain already known occurrences in a novel 
way.” (Danermark et al. in Lund, 2014: 227) The former is supported by Steinar Kvale who 
maintains that humans know the world through representations, and representations cannot be 
neutral; but is an act of writing culture (Kvale, 2009: 268). Therefore the strength of the case study 
is that it puts theory into action and “studies events in their-real life context” (Yin, 2003: 72). In 
sum, the ontological point of departure in this paper is taken in social constructivism, which holds 
the position that subjects matter and that social meaning is constructed and reconstructed by actors. 
 
2.2. A personal note 
The people and history of South Sudan have intrigued me long for a long time. It was therefore in 
my interest to write my Global Studies dissertation about state building, modern statehood and 
sovereignty, exemplified in the world’s youngest state, South Sudan. The process of the thesis 
officially began in February 2015, and in March, I travelled to Juba, South Sudan to conduct 
fieldwork. However, I travelled with a dual purpose. While I was collecting data for my thesis I was 
additionally constructing the NGO South Sudan Veterans Association1. South Sudan Veterans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1 Information about this project can be retrieved on www.southsudanveterans.org a webpage I created after end stay in 
Juba. 
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Association works to improve the livelihood of the many war veterans of South Sudan. We were 
two delegates travelling, my friend who is ethnically Nuer and born in South Sudan, and myself. 
The veteran project has been underway since 2013 and is now finally materialising. As a 
consequence the South Sudan Ministry of Veteran Affairs invited us to Juba and covered all our 
expenses. This provided me with opportunities but also limited my findings, and till be considered 
below. 
 
This combination of purposes of my expedition opened doors and created connections that ordinary 
fieldwork would not have provided me with. But the position also entailed limitations and I was 
continually faced with dilemmas. Morally, ethically and finally security dilemmas: I was traveling 
to a country that internally was fighting a semi-ethnic, where political engagement can cost you 
your life, I travelled together with my friend (who despite good contacts) is ethnically Nuer – one of 
the warring parties in the conflict. We were invited by the Ministry of Veteran Affairs, and at the 
same time, I was conducting (critical) research for my Master thesis. To exemplify the severity of 
the situation, it should be mentioned how two weeks before our arrival a British Aid worker from 
the Carter Centre lost his life outside his house in Juba (The Guardian, 2015), allegedly after 
delivering delicate information to his government. That is to say, the environment in which we 
operated, especially the SPLM leadership, was aggravated and angry with the international 
community for interfering in national affairs and issuing sanctions on the country for not finding a 
peace resolution. Consequently, I had to be very careful with whom I discussed politics, whom I 
approached for interviews and where discussions and interviews took place. Therefore I was forced 
to do most of my interviews under the radar of the public eye and had to avoid interviewing the 
SPLM/A leadership. Instead I interviewed bureaucrats, a local NGO, the opposition leader (SPLM-
DC), local scholars and an exceptional Governor. Furthermore, a planned interview with a local 
journalist had to be cancelled for security reasons. 
 
I recognise that my data collection and interviews largely were limited from the standing 
government. Juxtaposing the SPLM and the opposition had been interesting.  However, in time of 
war and international pressure hostility towards outsiders is mounting, so interviewing the SPLM 
top in Juba was never on the table. Security dilemmas are characteristic for research conducted in 
areas affected by violent conflict, as researchers easily get “caught in a dilemma between 
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apprehension and comprehension” (Hoffmann, 2014: 4). Even if interviews with leading figures of 
the Government had been conducted I would severely doubt their ability to be honest and open due 
to the on-going intra-state war. All along I was aware of bias from each article and interviewee, and 
therefore I do not judge my lack of access to the national political leadership a vital weakness of 
this thesis. Rather, I see the somewhat critical and semi-structured interviews with scholars and 
opponents of the established system and government as strengthening a holistic conceptualisation of 
the field of enquiry. 
 
As reflected in the above section, my friend as co-delegate from South Sudan Veteran Association 
became my main access to interviewees. According to the methodological discourse presented by 
Hoffmann, my friend operated as my local broker. Hoffmann maintains that the role of brokers and 
specifically their interpretation of security situations are vital and ought to be respected. Even more 
so in conflict settings and research about emotional and political issues like ethnic conflict, 
corruption and violence (Hoffmann, 2014: 7). These issues are all applicable in this case. I was 
never rejected by the SPLM, but I respected my broker's advice, when he argued it was too 
hazardous to enlighten them in my research, let alone ask for an interview. Subsequently, the 
closest I came to the core of the standing government was an interview by the Governor of Upper 
Nile, who enlightened me the best he could while being recorded. 
 
2.3. Methodological procedures and ethical considerations 
As I was limited from the SPLM top I selected diverse and well-equipped informants. It was my 
strategy to interview and talk to people of different age groups, tribes, level of education and 
profession, in order to encounter different narratives, perspectives and visions of the state and 
nation. None of the approached informants declined to participate or to be recorded. And each of 
my interviewees were informed about my aim of the research before beginning the interview. After 
one interview ended one interviewee even reassured me that GOSS would never read my thesis 
‘because they do not read’, he said with a grin. 
 
I prepared for the interviews before departure and I decided based on my extensive existing 
knowledge of the country, to make semi-structured interviews. I preferably asked ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
question to increase substance in my data (Yin, 2003). Due to my unique situation in the field I 
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embarked upon a unique approach in order to stay under the radar. I did not approach interviewees 
and interview opportunities prior to my stay. Instead I had decided to approach as many and as 
different people as possible and then let myself be guided by the process of being present in the 
field and by the data this provided me with. This strategy was available and worked out only 
because I had a well-informed, sociable and talkative broker who helped and taught me how to 
navigate and network in Juba. 
 
With each interview I became more knowledgeable and a better interviewer, which allowed me in 
an informed way to conduct the interviews without relying my research guide. Its presence 
therefore dwindled throughout the process of my research as I indulged in the process of 
exploration by and asking good questions, being a good listener, adaptive and flexible. More so as I 
arrived to Juba with an extensive historical knowledge about the country, I was able to be emphatic 
and sympatric; yet critical towards the provided information. Especially the role of ethnicity, power 
positions, personal bias and client-patronage was familiar to me and helped me to navigate and read 
between the lines when needed. For instance, I noticed that informants close to the SPLM seem to 
speak less freely, whereas non-SPLM affiliates spoke more freely.  This code of conduct is 
according to Michael Taussig coined “public secrets”. Accordingly, in his literary work Defacement 
(Taussig, 1999) public secrets can be defined as that which is generally known but cannot be 
spoken about publicly. It is thus defined as the “power on the unsaid” and “absent presence” of its 
own existence, and Taussig hereby argue that the public secret constitute society (Taussig, 1999: 5). 
Accordingly, the public secret renders the social knowledge of “knowing what not to know” and 
“active not-knowing”, notions which challenges the Foucaultian “knowledge is power” episteme 
(Taussig, 1999: 5). At the same time, public secrets must be spoken in order to be preserved, and he 
points towards the ‘drama of revelation’, where a taboo is transgressed and the secret revealed. 
Nonetheless, the act of revelation spoils the taboo and not the secret, and thus the public secret is 
reproduced: “Truth is not a matter of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation which 
does justice to it.” (Walter Benjamin in Taussig), Taussig phrases: “I regard the public secret as 
fated to maintain the verge where the secret is not destroyed through exposure, but subject to a 
revelation that does justice to it” (Taussig, 1999: 8). He renders secrecy the core of power and 
central in social processes, which reverse the modern Canon of the state that secrecy is the buffer 
that holds society together, because it permits conflicting social forces to coexist and gives society 
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strength to persevere itself. As a consequence of the highly infected and on-going civil war, ‘public 
secrets’ was a strategy employed by most in the capital, and therefore most of my conversations and 
some of my interviews were covered cryptic answers and public secrets. I was prepared for bias 
from my informants as my role as a narrator is to talks on behalf of others (Kvale: 2009), and I 
therefore adapted to the local discourse in order to decipher the answers which always were present 
between the lines of the retrieved information. 
 
Finally, a good case study according to Yin is an exploration and a process of continuous 
interaction between retrieved information. This method is detailed by Gregory Bateson in ‘Mind 
and Nature’, were he argues research is a process of self-correction. He visualise this process in his 
”Feedback model”, which depicts self-correction on ones research as a continually process of 
feedback followed by calibration, feedback and calibration and so on (Bateson, 1979: 84-85). My 
process of conducting this research can therefore be defined as an interaction and calibration 
between existing and growing knowledge of South Sudan and of theory in order to deepen my 
understanding and finally answer my problem formulation and research questions. The research 
process of feedback and calibration therefore developed my understanding of the problem and its 
explanations, which for instance is seen in the difference that exist in my interview questions which 
are focused around political visions for independence rather than issues concerning the political 
settlement that eventually proved fundamental. Although it is a shame that I was unable to ask 
about these matters due to my theoretical knowledge at the time and public secrecy, Bateson’s 
model suggests that this is part of my conceptualisation and research process. This is reflected in the 
diagram below. 
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Diagram 1. Illustrates the process of my research through Gregory Bateson’s ‘Feedback’ model. 
 
Last, the transcriptions of the interviews are enclosed so readers can look up questions and contexts. 
To make them accessible and to maintain and enforce the arguments the transcriptions are based on 
intelligent verbatim. Also, during my stay in Juba I interacted with numerous South Sudanese 
citizens. I regard this knowledge sharing as informal interviews, as I approach research with the 
notion that everything is data. The informal interviews were not recorded and I will neither provide 
information about the interviewees. The succeeding section serves as methodological transparency 
and presents key information about each interviewee and the interview setting in the chronological 
order they were conducted: 
 
1. Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin – Chariman of SPLM-DC 
2. Maror Ayuel Rehan – Director of Benefits in the ministry of Veteran Affairs 
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3. Deng Bol Arusai Bol – Chirman of the Red Army Foundation 
4. Dr. Luka Biong Deng – Professor at Juba University 
5. Brigadier General Simon Kun Pouch - Governor of Upper Nile State 
6. William Deng Deng - Chairperson for national DDR (Disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration) commission 
 
Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin – Chairman of SPLM-DC 
Lam Akol Ajawin (ethnic Shilluk) has been a high-ranking official in SPLM and together with Riek 
Mancher formed and led the Nasir faction breaking with SPLM in 1991 to replace John Garang 
(Johnson, 2011: 111-118). Later he re-joined SPLM and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for 
Sudan in 2005-07. He is now head of SPLM-DC (Sudan People Liberation Movement Democratic 
Change), which he founded in 2009 as a consequence of what he deemed as undemocratic practices 
within SPLM. SPLM-DC is the only other party in the National Assembly besides SPLM. The 
government has currently retrieved the passport of Lam Akol, and a personal security guard 
constantly accompanies him. For personal security the Interview was kept secret under the radar 
and was conducted in a calm environment of a Hotel in Juba. The interview environment was 
friendly and Dr. Lam Akol showed great gratitude to participate in knowledge sharing and to 
present his political perspectives, visions and agenda to the world. He was my first interviewee and 
his impressive CV and knowledge was slightly intimidating. However, his warm persona and 
laughing friendliness relaxed me. We met once more for a friendly chat before my departure and 
our acquainted interaction is maintained. 
 
 
Maror Ayuel Rehan – Director of Benefits in the ministry of Veteran Affairs 
Maror Ayuel Rehan (ethnic Dinka) has served 8 years in the SPLA, during Sudan’s second civil 
war, where he daily participated in the war. He joined the army when he was approximately 14 
years old and later received asylum in the US as a UN refugee. He stayed in the US for fifteen 
years. Maror Rehan holds a Master of Business education from Middle, Tennessee State University 
and a Master’s of Business Administration from Strayer University. He returned to South(ern) 
Sudan in 2010 to participate and build his country he helped to liberate 15 years earlier. He now 
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works in Veterans Affairs as Director of Benefits. I was in daily contact with Maror throughout my 
stay in South Sudan due to the Veteran project, and we became good friends. Due to Maror’s 
‘Western mind-set’ and our personal relation he was amongst the closest I could get to the SPLM/A 
government officials regarding my thesis interviews. Consequently, the interview was conducted in 
my Hotel and I felt confident to ask him the planned as well as improvised questions. In most other 
cases I was seen as a security threat for South Sudan, representing the International Community and 
their increasing negative opinion sparked 13th of December 2013 with the war. 
 
 
Deng Bol Arusai Bol – Chirman of the Red Army Foundation 
Deng Bol Arusai Bol is national Chairman of the Red Army Foundation of South Sudan, the branch 
of underage Veterans who participated in the second civil war from 1983-2005. Deng Bol was 
likewise part of the South Sudanese diaspora and returned to participate in the construct of South 
Sudan as an independent state and nation. The Red Army Foundation estimates that up to a million 
underage soldiers took part in the armed struggle. The Red Army Foundation fights for recognition, 
rights and representation of “young minds” in South Sudanese politics. The interview opportunity 
occurred spontaneously during a Veteran meeting as I felt Deng Bol was able to represent civil 
society. This interview was conducted publicly with other delegates of the Red Army Foundation 
and is taking form of a group interview instead of a personal interview. 
 
 
Dr. Luka Biong Deng – Professor at Juba University 
Dr. Luka Biong Deng (tribe unknown but from the disputed Abyei area). Luka Biong is Director for 
Centre for peace and development studies, Juba University. Dr. Luka Biong was willing to set aside 
an hour for my interview, which was conducted in his office at Juba University in a friendly tone. 
This interview was particularly interesting as Dr. Luka Biong combined two different and 
sometimes contradictory discourses: the critical scholarly University discourse and the local 
politicised public discourse of Juba. At this point of interview experience I took my point of 
departure in my interview guide but also let the process of information from the professor guide me. 
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Brigadier General Simon Kun Pouch - Governor of Upper Nile State 
The Governor of Upper Nile (ethnic Nuer) proved to be a very interesting joker in my line of 
interviews. It is worth mentioning that his state is ethnically basically Nuer inhabited and is 
extremely affected by the current war between SPLM and SPLM-IO. The Governor was therefore a 
busy and important man and his presence was an honour. I only managed to see him due to kin-line 
affiliation and networking of my broker who knew him and his family. The interview was held at 
Da Vinci, one of Juba’s finest restaurants by the Nile River over a glass of wine. Four people were 
present. He was the closest I came to the SPLM elite and he was an interesting hybrid of interest, as 
he represented Nuer area and interests while maintains his personal position in the SPLM. The 
Governor was not content with being recorded but accepted it when I explained my need to do so. 
The Governor increasingly claimed the stage and the interview transgressed towards a monolog of 
historical accounts including the weekend that began the political crisis in SPLM/A, meanwhile he 
was unable to speak freely. This is a perfect example of Taussig’s public secrets, the crucial and 
critical points went unmentioned publicly yet we all knew of them, and knew that reality was to be 
read between the lines. This became evident three people accepted the secretive narrative presented 
by the Governor. 
 
 
William Deng Deng - Chairperson for national DDR (Disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration) commission.  
William Deng Deng has lived many years in Canada and now holds an important position in 
developing South Sudan and reintegrating former soldiers in their communities. He holds a BA and 
Master Degree from York University and has previously worked with DDR for the United Nations 
in Rwanda. As an educated man and part of the Diaspora, Deng Deng was one of the few who 
spoke more freely and direct with me. The interview was conducted in his office in  downtown 
Juba. At this point of my research I left the interview guide and formed the questions during the 
interview. 
 
The preceding Chapter clarified how, where and with whom my interviews were conducted, along 
with the problems, limitations and the opportunities that arose along the way. This last section will 
scrutinise the limitations of my approach in the field. As reflected in the above the political crisis 
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and interstate war restricted me from interviewing the SPLM leadership in Juba. It also meant that I 
had to be careful with and around all my interviewees. For instance, I wanted to interview a 
journalist, which entailed going to his office at the local paper. However, our means of transport 
throughout our stay was a Government car with a personal driver, and with a high chance of 
Government surveillance around areas such as the newspaper I had to decline this opportunity. In 
other words, the unstable political environment led by a paranoid SPLM top and my official stay 
challenged my access to information. Another central limitation in my fieldwork was my approach 
to interview opportunities, which in retrospect was a bit arbitrary. I maintain that this was the cards 
I was giving in the particular political situation, however, it prohibited me from making ten or more 
interviews I initially strived for as time went by fast. My fully booked schedule throughout the 10 
days unfortunately limited me from conducting the quantity of interviews I preferred, and so, if I 
were to do it all over, I would stay longer in South Sudan. 
 
The following will launch Chapter 3, the analytical framework. 
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Chapter 3: Analytical framework 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The coming Chapter presents how I analytically will approach “the breakdown of the new South 
Sudanese state occurring so soon after independence”. The analytical framework as well as the later 
analysis will be divided into two parts. The first part of the analytical framework and analysis will 
introduce the social and cultural aspects of the emergence of the state and nation, and will do so in 
order to answer the second research question which asks: “how was (nation)state building pursued 
in South Sudan after the CPA/independence and who drove the project and how did the embryonic 
state fit the idea of the Westphalian state imaginary?”. The analytical framework will therefore 
begin with the subchapter 3.2. ‘Conceptualisation of ‘the state’, which introduces the development 
of the Western European state, and moreover consists of the following sections: ‘The binary of the 
waves of statehood’, ‘Constructing of the imaginary’ and ‘The imagined community – the people 
and the nation’. 
 
The second part of the analytical framework and analysis explores a political economy perspective 
in order to understand the importance of natural resources of the young state, and answer the third 
research question: “how can we understand the role natural resources played in the breakdown of 
the South Sudanese nation-state project after independence? To do so it will begin by presenting 
3.3. ‘The political economy of resource endowment’, which consists of the sections: ‘commodity 
surge as development strategy’ ’The ressource curse’ and ’The political settlemnet’. 
 
Taken together the first and second part of the analytical framework and analysis is fit to answer my 
problem formulation: “how can we understand the breakdown of the new South Sudanese state and 
nation occurring so soon after independence?”. 
 
3.2. Conceptualisation of ‘the state’  
 
“This myth of the state seems to persist in the face of everyday experiences of the often 
profoundly violent and ineffective practices of government or outright collapse of states. 
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It persists because the state, or institutionalized sovereign government, remains pivotal in 
our imagination of what a society is” (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 17). 
 
Essential is the notion that the modern state was an evolution rather than an intended outcome. 
According to Charles Tilly in ‘War Making and State Making as Organised Crime’, the democratic 
modern state was an unintended outcome. The beginning of the state was founded in the chaotic 
processes of contemporary power holders’ coercion of material resources amongst each other and 
the people. The state was thus founded upon European war and power struggles between Christian 
Churches, Kings, Nobels and merchants, and consequently Tilly maintains that it was wars that 
made states (Tilly, 1990: 170). It was not until the thirty-year-war culminated in the Westphalian 
peace in 1648 the fundamental norm of state-sovereignty ended the chaotic processes (Tilly, 1990) 
and a state monopoly of the means of violence, another corner stone of the modern state was 
established (Schwarts, 2010: 11). According to Habermas the modern European state developed 
through the incremental juridification: 
 
1. “The establishment and consolidation of the monopolies of physical force and of the taxation 
in the absolutist state. 
2. The break with personal monopoly of power in the absolutist state in constitutional 
monarchies by legally anchoring state power in political institutions and civil law. 
3. The bourgeois revolutions initiated the nationalization of the state monopolies, eventually 
bringing about the democratic nation state, with its separation of juridical, legislative and 
executive powers. 
4. The formation of the welfare state tamed the autonomous dynamics that spring from the 
accumulative logic of the economic system and incorporated a variety of social functions 
into the domain o f modern statehood” (Habermas in Jung, 2008: 36). 
 
The key of modern statehood nevertheless remains as Max Weber boldly phrased it: “monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919: 1). In conclusion, the 
European state-formation was a non-intended outcome but it nonetheless changed human 
community, inside and eventually outside European state borders. 
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The Weberian definition of ideal statehood can be reflected in the ‘the security-development nexus’ 
in which national security is taken as a prerequisite for development (Buur et al, 2007). The nexus 
holds that “a stable and effective state is a precondition for human development and human 
security, and a state which fails to provide development and security to its citizens is neither strong 
nor stable. It is fragile” (Andersen et al., 2007: 4). This reflects the importance of functional and 
legitimate national institutions that comes with consolidated states, and therefore state formation 
processes are increasingly taken as prerequisite to development of fragile states. 
 
In ‘State formation and State building: Is there a lesson to learn from Sociology?’ Dietrich Jung 
(2008) explores how consolidated states do not build on a state monopoly of violence alone, but is 
additionally attached to the cultural order of society in which it gains its legitimacy and political 
authority (Jung, 2008). Jung suggest that it is authority is key as it defines the state’s leverage to 
issue and follow legal rules in comparison to pre-modern forms of authority based on personal ties. 
In this Jung follows Norbert Elias as continues that state formation can be seen as “a civilising 
process of society” in which structures and social behaviour are interwoven (Jung, 2008). 
 
This suggests that state formation implies at least a two dimensional perspective related to the slow 
emergence of a set of state institutions, as well as a social process related to legitimacy and 
authority where these state institutions becomes accepted. In many ways this contrasts, as I will 
suggest with the ‘state-building’ approach that seems to focus solely on the state institutional side of 
the equation. 
 
The binary between waves of statehood 
The above accounted for the origins and ‘the first wave’ of state building. However, it is pivotal to 
keep in mind that the European state formation was an evolution made up of many small 
revolutions. Subsequently, any later attempt of state formation and state building will not share the 
same historical references and characteristics, and therefore a binary between the European and the 
postcolonial state building and state formation process is bound to exist. In essence it can be said 
that European evolution was a state formation defined as a process, and the latter varieties often 
takes form as deliberate achievements defined as state building. Dietrich Jung preserves that the 
original concepts still holds, but argues that one ought to be cautious when turning modern 
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statehood into a normative blueprint for current and postcolonial state builders. What does this 
difference connote and with which consequences? 
 
What segregates second and third wave state formation from the forgoing is the reversed way in 
which they obtained statehood before they developed a monopoly of the means of violence, rather 
than beginning with state monopoly on the means of violence followed by a gradual jurisdictional 
expansion and later a democratisation process (Jung, 2008). Jung explains the postcolonial 
introduction to statehood, which is similar to South Sudan upon independence: 
 
“The decolonization process established statehood only as a form of external 
representation, as a formal territory and legal framework of international law. Behind 
the façade of modern state institutions, however, social practices of a quite different 
nature have continued”  (Jung, 2008: 39-40). 
 
In reality, he suggests the postcolonial state often neither has a monopoly, nor the means of 
violence or legitimacy stemming from political authority. Instead, statehood becomes a façade 
that conceals a reality of competing practices and logics, which in essence are unfit with those 
of modern statehood. Empirical reality of the state is thus closer to what he refers to as 
‘controlled anarchy’, in which overlapping interests’ amongst the various stakeholders prevails. 
He maintains: “For all these actors, the image of the state serves as a central normative 
reference while they follow their own goal on the ground” (Jung, 2008: 40). In this manner, the 
‘negative sovereignty’ becomes an image of a state rather than a legal entitlement. He 
continues: 
 
“From this perspective, ‘fragile states’ are not a new phenomenon at all. On the 
contrary, measured by the standard of the ideal image of modern statehood, most 
postcolonial states have been defective states from the beginning. In many of them, a 
legitimate monopoly of physical force has not yet been achieved, and the so-called new 
wars of our times are therefore less an expression of state decay, than an indication that 
the ‘classical’ European path to modern statehood has been derailed” (Jung, 2008: 39-
40). 
 
	   	   	  	  
	   25	  
With this in mind Jung problematizes the discrepancy between the concealing façade of statehood 
and academic definition, which draws on the European state formation process. Accordingly, the 
academic definition of the ideal state has become expected and the blueprint of postcolonial state 
building, although it “disregards both the historical length and the social and developmental steps 
which eventually resulted in this form of modern social contract between state-builder and society 
(Jung, 2008: 37). Although Weber referred to the contradictions of the state-dimensions (the 
slippage between institution, image and social practice) more than a century ago, modern statehood 
in its narrow sense maintains the normative definition of what we deem proper stateness or 
statehood. The contradictions between institution, image and social practice are especially evident 
in the postcolonial African state, where political actors are held hostage between competing logics 
and realities and hereby must abide to a nexus of good governance, the client/patronage network as 
well as the traditional African redistribution praxis. Therefore, African politicians must 
simultaneously satisfy different audiences with conflicting norms of and practices (Jung, 2008: 39-
40), which inherently undermines the modern state project as we will seen in Chapter five and six. 
 
In their introduction to the book ‘States of imagination’ Hansen and Stepputat likewise disaggregate 
European first-wave state building from the later, arguing that trajectories towards statehood differ. 
They argue that an assessment, which compares and suggest a wide-ranging imitation of European 
statehood, is likely to deem any attempt of postcolonial statehood as ‘failing’ and ‘weak’. They 
therefore criticise the blueprint’s proposed universality, which always already inhabit specific 
features, functions and forms of government (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 7). Therefore it is 
increasingly suggested by a wide array of scholars that contemporary processes of state building as 
pursued by post-conflict reconstruction attempts and the World Bank should be theoretically as well 
as practically disaggregated from the European process. It is argued that there is a strong global 
desire for ‘stateness’ yet this stateness does not carry a global and therefore universal connotation 
but rather a local. Therefore, social science will gain from exploring the empirical existence of 
states and their different actors who in various ways and unlike the recommendation of the blueprint 
notion of ‘state-building’ with its heavy focus on institutions and getting institutions right, are 
negotiated statehood (Hagmann & Péclard 2010). 
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In conclusion, the above have conceptualised the trajectory of ‘the state’ and designated a 
discrepancy between the first wave of state formation and the latter versions. It stated how ‘first 
wave’ stat formation was founded on bloody and chaotic processes in which monopoly of the 
means of violence was established before juristictional expansion. For the second and third wave 
state formation this occurs the other way around, which has resulted in negative statehood 
unanchored in empirically statehood, as we will see in the analysis. Chapter five will zoom in on 
how the blue print notion of institution building has been pursued in South Sudan and then explore 
how this notion of state building fitted the reality of the young state. It will become evident that the 
nation-state logic perused along with the state building is one of three logics persisting in South 
Sudan, and it will be seen how the disputing logics will challenge the survival of the state project. 
Consequently, I have so far proposed a theoretical framework in which we can understand the 
postcolonial state rather than compare it to the blueprint notion of the European state formation. 
 
Construction of the imaginary 
Hansen & Stepputat (2001) propose to move beyond the blueprint and to grasp the postcolonial 
state on its own through ethnographies of the state. They propose the postcolonial statehood is 
comprehended in its social and historical configuration of myths, paradoxes and inconsistencies and 
read in its own practical, symbolic and performative ‘language of stateness’. Language of stateness 
refer to the processes in which the modern state constructs itself by staging its’ everyday 
appearance (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 5). Hansen & Stepputat refers to the languages states apply 
to channel their existence and can be boiled down to ‘governance’ and ‘authority’. The language of 
governance contains technical and practical means: monopoly of the means of violence, control of 
populations through knowledge production, and last social and economic development of the 
country. Language of authority includes symbolic languages of reproduction of state authority: the 
institutionalisation of law materialisation of the state through signs and rituals, and the 
nationalisation of the state territory and institutions through shared history and culture. Hansen and 
Stepputat claim that the significance of the combination matters and argue a state only exists by 
applying both languages of governance and authority (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 7-8). State-ness is 
not defined by reforms or policies, rather it is the mythodology of the state: the rhetoric, titles, 
rituals and authority of the state, which is produced and reproduced in daily encounters, especially 
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via mundane practices such as authorising and registration of marriages, births and deaths. This way 
the state seizes authority and dominance and thus became the hegemonic structure in society. In 
conclusion, stateness occurs through its applied languages and is materialised in the ‘imagination of 
the state’. Therefore, state appearance in its reproduction and legitimisation as the frame of society 
is central for the maintenance of its state-ness, as well as the imagination of statehood. 
 
This imagination of the state is additionally taken up by sociologist Philip Abrams in ‘Notes on the 
Difficulty of Studying the State’ where he argues the state is an ideology not a material entity. 
Therefore, the state exists through the idea of it (Abrams, 1988: 69). According to Abrams the idea 
of the state begins as an ‘implicit construct’, then becomes reified as the public reification and thus 
attain a “symbolic identity progressively divorced from practice as an illusory account of practice” 
(Abrams, 1988: 58). He sees it as a mask of domination which “first and foremost an exercise in 
legitimation – and what is being legitimised is, we may assume, something which if seen directly 
and as itself would be illegitimate, an unacceptable domination” (Abrams, 1988: 76). Accordingly, 
the state conceals its political processes as it resists examination through official secrecy: “The state 
is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which 
prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (Abrams, 1988: 82). The idea of a state is in Abram’s 
view a construction based on the inherent need of remaining masked and hereby remaining 
legitimate. 
 
As state-ness materialises through the imagination and ideology of the state are socially rested 
constructions. This also means the notions can be jeopardised if not preserved well, for instance by 
various types of mismanagement of state and state funds. Hansen & Stepputat mentions how 
contemporary societies are governed by expired administrative systems and procedures and fail to 
adapt timely, as governments fail to implement the needed structural reforms and instead instrument 
policies of symbolic and nationalistic value (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 29). Zooming in on 
postcolonial state, they maintain that senior bureaucrats predominate and entrench the state-
discourse, and therefore often attempt changes gradually rather then progressively. In some cases, 
certain sectors of the state apparatus founded in the colonial, military or authoritarian inheritance 
enjoys substantial autonomy, and has “developed extremely resilient forms of organisation, 
recruitment and functioning, that few political parties dare to confront”. These are in other words 
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almost self-governing institutions within the state apparatus (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 29-30), 
like SPLA/M in South Sudan. This point towards the problematic combination of resilience and 
reluctance of reform and exploration, which results in path dependence of governance and the 
maintenance or survival of the ‘imagination of the state’ rather then actual political change and 
improvement. We just need to think about the different types of patronage system prevalent in the 
postcolonial state, which likely fragment the state and hereby jeopardize its central mythological 
dimension, they argue. 
 
In conclusion, this section argued the state achieves its stateness and mythodological dimension of 
imagination in a combination of languages of governance and authority. It was additionally argued 
how the state can be perceived as an a social construction and an ideology of domination, whose 
actions often are far from what be assume and expect it to be. Henceforth, the (postcolonial) state 
consists of myths, paradoxes and inconsistencies anchored in resilient self-governing institutions 
within the state. 
 
The imagined community – the people and the nation 
In the applauded book “Imagined Communities” Benedict Anderson details the trajectory of 
European nationalism, and how it throughout the 20th century developed into the internationally 
accepted political norm of the nation-state. However, the road for the postcolonial was another. 
According to Anderson, nationalism in the postcolonial state was founded on the imagination of the 
colonial state. The idea that a territory could be mapped, the population could be identified through 
a census and that the population and the territory shared a specific history “defined the way in 
which the colonial state imagined its domination” (Anderson, 2006: 164). 
 
Accordingly, it was the colonial legacy, which shaped the grammar of the imagined community of 
the postcolonial nation-state. Anderson defines nationalism as “an imagined political community – 
and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2006: 6) It is imagined because most 
its’ members are strangers to each other yet conceive a shared communion. It is limited as other 
nations surround it and create boundaries. It is sovereign because within nationalism is the dream of 
freedom where the sovereign nation-state can express itself. In conclusion it is a community 
because nationalism “despite inequality and exploitation in each, the nation is always conceived as 
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a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 2006: 7). This comradeship and fraternity is the reason 
its subjects are willing to risk their lives let alone taking others’ in the name of the nation. The 
central point of Anderson’s perspective is the way in which the community is constructed through 
the naturalisation of the imagination. Therefore, communities are distinguished by the way in which 
they are imagined and emotionally legitimate. As a consequence, not only nations, but also tribes, 
clans and states can be investigated as imagined communities. 
 
Within the connotation of motherland and fatherland or for instance the Nuer, the Dinka or the 
Shilluk tribe, exists an innate naturalness of the nation/tribe and nationality/ethnicity, which create 
un-chosen ties amongst the subjects. Anderson explains: 
 
“nation-ness is assimilated to skin colour, gender, parentage, and birth-era – all those 
things one cannot help” and because these natural ties are un-chosen they have around 
them “a halo of interconnectedness” (Anderson, 2006: 143). 
 
In order to maintain the interconnectedness of the nation it is reproduced via its symbols such as 
anthems, emblems and the national flag. Consequently, imagined communities remain naturalised 
and persist embedded in their societies. 
 
A century before Anderson, the French philosopher Joseph Renan likewise contemplated on ‘the 
nation’. Renan found that national unity often grows out of a process of common suffering. He 
defines the nation as “a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of sacrifices that one have 
made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future” (Renan, 2001: 83). The 
notion of suffering is closely connected to the definition of ‘the people’: “the very definition of the 
word was born out of compassion, and the term became equivalent for misfortune and 
unhappiness…” (Hannah Arendt in Agamben, 1995: 29). Hansen & Stepputat adds that the notion 
of people is often associated negatively in contrast to the notion of community, which is imagined 
as virtuous and authentic or as “dangerous, unpredictable and ungovernable” (Hansen & Stepputat, 
2001: 25). 
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To summarise, this section depicted Anders definition of the nation as an imagined political 
community. Imagined communities can be nations as well as tribes, and are defined by emotional 
legitimacy of comradeship inside the community. Especially suffering showed to increase unity and 
raise imagined communities, which we will se is also the case in South Sudan. 
 
The issue of nationalism and the people will help answering the first working question exploring 
how the nation was envisioned by the SPLM before and during the civil war. It is thus included in 
the analytical framework to understand the visions and imagination of an independent nation, which 
will be further explored in Chapter four. The terminology of ‘the people’ will be applied to detect 
whether there was a difference in vision between the elite and the community/people and how the 
visions were used. Due to the long and bloody history of South Sudan the notion of nationalism 
seemed at first glance to have played a crucial role in its development, yet whether or not this is the 
case will be explored as it became less prevalent as the analysis evolved. 
 
3.3. The political economy of resource endowment 
The following will present the second aspect of the analytical framework related to how we can 
understand the political economy of natural resources in the breakdown of the South Sudanese state. 
It will begin by exploring the importance of natural resources in development strategies in Sub-
Saharan African countries, then it will make sense of the much-debated ‘Resource Curse’ and last 
account for the clientelist Political settlement approach. This is exercised in order to understand the 
political economy of resource plenty in South Sudan. 
 
Commodity surge as development strategy 
From the inception of the twenty-first century a persistent boom in international commodity prices 
saw FDI flow steadily into Africa causing many Sub-Saharan African states to experience a high 
and relative consistent growth in GDP rates. Hopes were high that commodities could drive the 
African development agenda and some scholars once again foresaw “Africa’s emergence” 
(Whitfield et al., 2015: 3).2 The innate volatility of commodity prices seemed as a consequence to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A commodity is defined as an undifferentiated, low value added product, originating from the earth and priced by 
speculation in the global market. 
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be reduced because of “the super cycle” of high prices (Faaroki & Kaplinsky, 2012) resulting from 
China’s relatively stable and skyrocketing demands for natural resources after 2003. The prolonged 
surge in commodity prices created a renaissance for the resource-development nexus, which swayed 
away many resource abundant African states from traditional donor facilitated development 
strategies towards resource driven development. Consequently, a period of positivity concerning 
extractive industries (gas, oil and coal) was inaugurated and resource driven development gained 
ground (Buur et al. 2013). 
 
The booming growth rates were based on a combination of the rising international commodity 
prices, economic liberalisation, new discoveries of natural resources and increases of foreign aid, 
but were not followed by long-term economic strategies such as industrial policies triggering 
economic transformation. The economic boom of commodity exporters therefore failed to create 
“significant job creation, rising standards of living, and sustainable poverty reduction”, or to 
increase productivity, create new production or export opportunities. (Whitfield et al., 2015: 3). 
Consequently, most of these countries were unsuccessful in capturing the momentum and maintain 
economic growth after the boom ended around the first quarter of 2014. 
 
As South Sudan is particularly oil dependent it had few other options than to extract natural 
resources. Resource development is thus not the strategy per se although the black gold along with 
development assistance has financed its process of state building. 
  
There are severe economic disadvantages connected to resource extraction as a main source of 
income. In the endeavour to define ‘rents’ Beblawi draws on Adam Smith and David Ricardo and 
concludes: “In its general usage, the term ‘rent’ is reserved for “the income derived from the gift of 
nature” (Beblawi, 1990: 49). One of the concerns regarding ‘renterism’ as well as resource driven 
development is the much debated ‘resource curse’. The curse first became centre for much 
academic discussion and debate after it was noted that resource abundant countries tend to generate 
poorer economic results then its non-resource abundant peers. It is argued that resource-endowed 
countries “tend to perform badly” (Sachs and Warner, 2001: 827-828), create bad political and 
economic outcomes (Hansen, 2014: 10), and subsequently fail to convert their endowment into 
sustainable economic growth, development and industrial development (Buur et al. 2013: 14). What 
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then, is the connection between resources and weak economic growth? As scholars continue to 
disagree over the causal effects of the resource curse and its existence the forthcoming will dive into 
the elements of the resource curse relevant for the political economy of South Sudan. The issues 
are: ‘crowding out effect’ and deindustrialisation; Volatility of commodity price and therefore 
income; Insufficient linkages; and Rentierism. 
 
The resource curse 
Buur et al. define the resource curse as follows: “the exploitation of commodities suppresses 
growth, undermines the development of industry, slows down economic transformation and leads to 
political deterioration” (Buur et al. 2013: 64). The most prominent part of the resource curse is the 
Dutch disease. The Dutch disease entails that a surge in natural resource prices will appreciate the 
national currency, increase  prices and therefore ‘crowd out’ other investments and reduce 
competitiveness of tradable sectors (often agriculture and manufacturing), and likely cause 
deindustrialisation and inflation (Hansen, 2014: 10; Buur et al. 2013: 14). The ‘crowding out effect’ 
hence refers to a situation in which resource booms initially benefit the terms of trade for the rent 
seeker, which then appreciate the national currency, yet at the same time ‘crowd out’ other 
investments as the rising commodity prices squeezes profit in manufacturing and hereby erode 
national competiveness resulting in decreasing demand for home-produced goods, lover production 
and growth, and therefore deindustrialise the economy of the rent seeker. 
 
Commodities are defined by their fluctuating prices determined by market forces, and are prone to 
windfalls, booms and bursts. The volatility of commodity prices is often more harming then stable 
declining prices, as the yo-yo effect of resource prices makes government income from rent taxation 
unpredictable. The fluctuations additionally make revenue macroeconomic stabilisation challenging 
to realise, and the terms of trade (TOT) difficult to manoeuvre (Buur et al. 2013: 17-20). Second, a 
low income-elasticity of rents makes it difficult to capitalise on a growing demand on natural 
resources. 
 
Central for long-term benefits of resource driven development is the building of linkages in and out 
of commodity production (Morris et al,. 2011: 6). Buur et al., inserts that through linkages-
development countries extend the scope of resource plenty: “growing the scale, range and depth of 
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domestic capabilities” by creating and participating in the commodity value chain (Buur et al. 2013: 
14). To help foster value-addition, forward and backward linkages in other sectors of the economy, 
Governments must make industrial policies. However, fostering linkages in extractive sectors is 
challenging due to the enclave nature of extractive resource abundance that arguably outcompetes 
other domestic industries. Therefore, the country over time becomes more and more dependent on 
its resources. 
 
The limited taxation of the population and a dependence on resource rents makes the rentier state 
economically independent from its population. It is therefore argued that the rentier state is likely to 
create low accountability and bad governance. The high commodity demand and growing 
dominance of China and their ‘South-South Cooperation’ and ‘non-interference policy’ increase 
concerns that autocratic leadership is mounting. 
 
For the reasons elaborated above I find that natural resource abundance creates few incentives for 
governments to diversify the national economy, and instead remain in the sectors of resource 
extraction. The exceeding description of the resource curse expresses a sinister story of resource 
endowment. However, Buur et al. maintains that resources can be a blessing if a political 
willingness allows governments to enhance productive capabilities, diverse the economy and 
redistribute power away from the ruling elites and towards the people.  Accordingly, academics are 
increasingly agreeing that many harmful outcomes of the “resource curse (enclave development, 
political conflict about access to resources macro-economic instability) can be overcome by 
introducing democracy and good governance” (Buur et al. 2013: 78). Morris et al, (2011a), defies 
the curse and states how the seeming connection between resource development and 
deindustrialisation often occurs due to a limited industrial development rather than as an effect of a 
resource curse. Others reflects the perspective of institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) and 
critics the curse for its macroeconomic ex ante, maintaining the effects stem from economic failures 
and mismanagement rather than resource endowments per se. Saad-Filho et al. elaborates:  
 
“It is impossible to say ex ante whether a boom is likely to lead to sustainable economic 
growth, inflation or Dutch disease. The outcome is likely to depend on the policy mix, the 
government’s priorities, and its capacity to implement consistent policies” (Saad-Filho et 
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al., 2013: 15). 
They instead suggest scholars ought to investigate which factors enable some countries to exploit 
their resource abundance to generate rent driven development and which factors counteract others 
from doing the same (Saad-Filho et al., 2013: 5). The above focused on the economic dimension of 
the political economy of resource endowment, and thus the coming will emphasize its political 
dimension. 
 
This section illuminated how rent seeking easily can trigger the resource curse. The resource curse 
was seen to ‘crowd out’ other investments and thus cause deindustrialization of other sectors of the 
economy (the Dutch disease) and create a volatile income for the rentier state. Chapter six will 
investigate where and why South Sudan is suffering from elements of the resource curse, in order to 
investigate the role of political economy in the breakdown of the young state. 
 
The political settlement 
In most SSA countries the public sector is the largest sector and employs more formal workers then 
the private sector combined. Therefore the majority of the population sustains a living through 
subsistence and petty production and trade. This creates a restricted fiscal basis of the state where 
only a fraction is taxed as most is outside the formal capitalist sector, and subsequently “African 
countries are poor because they have a large proportion of their population stuck in subsistence or 
low productivity economic activities” (Whitfield et al., 2015: 3). The limited taxation and activities 
in the capitalist economy combined with low production and productivity makes it challenging for 
national economies to sustain their political settlements, which are defined as the balance of power 
between the country’s groups of elites. As the state lacks a fiscal foundation to function efficiently 
and cover its obligations, it is driven by clientelist political settlements to ensure political stability 
(Whitfield et al., 2015: 22). According to the political settlement approach the ruling coalition of the 
political settlement is forced to accommodate and redistribute resources to groups who might 
threaten existing political stability: “ruling elites face pressures to redistribute resources to 
accommodate groups in society who can threaten political stability or who are part of the coalition” 
(Whitfield et al., 2015: 74). The patron-client network can be seen as an exchange between 
‘patrons’ and ‘clients’, where influence and support is negotiated and bought to allocate resources 
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to ‘clients’ whose support is important for the maintenance of the ruling elite. The distribution of 
power in the clientalist political settlement depends on “(1) the relative power within and outside 
the ruling coalition, and (2) the relative power of domestic capitalists vis-à-vis ruling elites and the 
technological capabilities of those capitalists” (Whitfield et al., 2015: 80). The system is applied to 
create coalitions and hereby avoid conflict and potential violence. Mustaq Khan defines political 
settlement as follows: 
 
“A political settlement emerges when the distribution of benefits supported by its 
institutions is consistent with the distribution of power in society, and the economic and 
political outcomes of these institutions are sustainable over time” (Khan, 2010: 1). 
According to Khan, the patron-client network exists in all developing countries, hence South Sudan, 
as a consequence of the non-existent class based-interests, which classically divide and shape 
political organisation. Instead, he argues, the system transpires as the most rational and modern 
form of organisation amongst leaders of all social levels and despite regime type. In short, 
subsequently; results of Political Settlements depends on the distribution of power, which “comes 
from the ability to organize and mobilize supporters, based on the use of economic resources as 
well as ideologies, identity, and symbols of legitimacy” (Whitfield et al., 2015: 22). 
 
Clientalistic political settlements thrive due to weak capitalist sectors. Its existence in SSA is to be 
found in the weak economy and scarce number of domestic capitalists who have failed to dominate 
the key exporting sectors as well as gaining political influence, resulting in an unbalanced 
relationship between the state and the market. The minor overlap between the ruling elite and 
domestic capitalists created precedence and a path dependency absent of industrial policies in the 
political settlements. Still today, property rights and “short-term political survival constrain the 
ability of ruling elites to change institutions and allocate resources as well as to manage and enforce 
learning rents” (Whitfield et al., 2015: 80; 24-25). 
 
The above presented the political settlement approach (PSA) by Mushtaq Khan. It argued that 
developing countries have weak capitalist sectors and therefore forms clientalistic rather then 
capitalist political settlement. This will approach will be applied in order to analyse the breakdown 
of the young state in Chapter six. 
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In sum, the analytical framework began by investigating the development of the European state and 
then portrayed the ways in which postcolonial state building contrasts the European state formation 
process. The effects hereof, in combination with the explored ‘imagination of the stat’ and 
‘stateness’ will be applied to scrutinise the modern state project in South Sudan, which is carried 
out in Chapter five. The analytical framework afterwards explored political economy challenges of 
resource endowment. This will be applied on South Sudan to understand the importance of their 
resource endowment. Finally, the political settlement approach was presented, which will help to 
explain the political reality of the young state. However, before we begin the analysis, Chapter four 
will guide us through some of the additionally needed milestones of South Sudan.  
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Chapter 4: Historical background 
 
This Chapter will present to the reader the needed background information about South Sudan prior 
to the analysis. It will begin with ‘South Sudan 101’, which briefly introduces vital historical facts 
about the region relevant for this paper. It will then account for the role of ethnicity in ‘A land of 
Tribes’, and eventually end by investigating the political visions prior to independence in ‘Farewell 
visions’ and after independence in ‘ending the political setup’. In sum Chapter four will answer the 
first research question, which asks “how the state and nation was envisioned before and during the 
second civil war of Sudan by the Sudan People Liberation Movement?”. 
 
4.1. South Sudan 101 
South Sudan is a federal state system and made up of 10 states and one central government placed 
in the Juba, the official capital. Ethnically, the country is made up of 64 different tribes / ethnic 
groups each with sub-clans, and each tribe has an individual culture and language. English is the 
official language, however, Arabic is widespread amongst most groups. The two largest ethnic 
groups are vital to understand the country’s social makeup: the Dinka estimated 35 percent of 
population and Nuers estimated 16 percent of the population. The two groups together represent 
estimated half the population, however, in government institution count for approximately 90 
percent, leaving the smaller tribes largely outside the power range (Lam Akol). 
 
In 1978 American oil giant Chevron found large oil reserves in Southern Sudan. The discovery 
coincided with an increasing awareness of the Northern economic and social neglect and 
stigmatisation of the South, at a time where the north began to impose Islamic laws on the pastoral 
south (Patey, 2014; Johnson, 2014). As the rights from earlier peace agreements increasingly 
became disrespected the Southerners came together and an organised army was formed and united 
under Sudan’s People Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM / SPLA), and the second civil war of 
Sudan broke out. Additionally, the second civil war was not secessionist, but a request for a share of 
power and resources (Lesch, 1987: 2; Patey, 2014). Shortly after the signing of the CPA’s, the 
founding farther Colonel John Garang de Mabior, the nations’s founding farther (Dr. John) 
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tragically died in a helicopter accident and left the people of Southern Sudan in a state of chock 
(BBC, 2013) and a new political reality was born. 
 
The comprehensive peace agreements served three purposes: to bring peace, divide oil fields and 
keep Sudan united after a referendum in the South. During the Interim period, the 6-year period 
from the signing of CPA’s until the referendum in January in 2011, articulation of independence 
amongst Southern leaders was scarce, and it was only slightly prepared for. Eventually, the vote 
materialised in the 2011 referendum, where 99,57 percent of the Southerners voted for separation 
from the North (Larson, 2013), and already in July same year, six months later, a new sovereign 
was born. Two crucial issues have to be raised here. First, Southern Sudan was left with 6 months to 
prepare for independence. During ‘united Sudan’, political decisions and resource rents were 
allocated in the North, and the South was economically and socially marginalised. Therefore, 
institutionally, South Sudan began from scratch, and the process to build up institutions in six 
months was far from realistic. Second, the SPLM remained the ‘liberation movement’ closely 
connected to the SPLA, and thus failed to reform and adapt to the new circumstances. 
 
4.2. A land of Tribes 
The Anglo-Egyptian condominium ruled Sudan from 1898 (Johnson, 2011, 9-19): “By then the 
societies in South Sudan were tribal groups that had nothing in common at all. The area, which was 
called South Sudan, was inhabited by tribes…” (Lam Akol, 37-38). The common characteristic of 
the Southern tribes during the 19th and early 20th century was the inhabitant of the same region. In 
the self-biography of three ‘Lost Boys’3: “They Poured Fire on Us From the Sky”, the authors 
explain how the Tribe came into being: 
 
“We call ourselves Dinka now, but according to our elders’ stories here was no such 
name before the British arrived. When an explorer came to our remote area and met a 
group of Monyjeng men hunting, he stopped them. “Who are you young men?” he 
asked in a strange language. “Ding Kak”, they replied, calling themselves by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Lost Boys refers to the children who fled their villages and families in the chaos of Northern attacks during Sudan
’s Second Civil War, who crossed the region on foot and eventually received asylum in The United States. 
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chiefs’ name according to the tradition of our people. The explorer wrote down 
“Dinka” and this is how our people came into being” (Deng et al. 2005: 3). 
 
The account depicts the how the British applied Anthropology to understand and use communities 
in their conquer and preservation of vast lands, under their ‘native rule’ or ‘native administration’. 
The different groups of people were ruled according to their cultures and tribal tradition (Lam Akol, 
70-90). Maror Rehan explains: 
 
”the British will select the one people are afraid off to head that area, that village or 
maybe that tribe. That is the reason the tribe was created. With the chief there was a 
British system, because they identified somebody strong, the person the villagers or 
maybe the clan, can be able to respect. (Maror Rehan, 73-76). 
 
The self-biography supports Benedict Anderson’s argument of the significance of the census and 
the map in the creation identity categories in British colonies. The classifications of identity 
categories articulated and fortified the existing differences and their fluid borders of Southern 
tribes. Therefore, the system established by the British amplified the identity categories and 
demarcation amongst tribes. These differences are still visible and imperative in contemporary 
constituency. 
 
Until the Juba Conference in 1947, the Islamic North and pastoral Nilotic South were treated 
separately and interaction amongst the tribes of the South were limited (Johnson, 2011: 25). From 
hereon, according to Egyptian and Sudanese desire, the British declared a union of the two regions: 
“the South and North are together” (Dr. Lam Akol, 2015 interview: 168-169). The union reflects 
an artificial confederation not connected to cultural, tribal or religious ties, but rather a result of an 
unequal colonial distribution of power and influence. As a consequence, the unity was never 
appreciated in the South: “The idea of independence has always been there in the Southerners, they 
never believed in this unity” (Lam Akol, 226-227), instead, a wish for separation ”has always been 
there, since the 1940s the South or southern Sudanese had always wanted to be a different entity” 
(Deng Bol 22-24). In conclusion, the wish for secession developed from the inception of United 
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Sudan, and therefore the discourse of resistance originated before the discovery of oil and before 
the establishment of SPLM. 
 
According to Lam Akol there was no articulation of what made the South the South after the CPAs: 
”You see, we are more united by what we didn't want than what we are or what we want, and that is 
one of the problems” (Lam Akol, 29-30). He elaborates: ”It is only what the South doesn't want and 
this explains why the moment that enemy was out of the way, then we are stuck, because what is it 
that we want?” (Lam Akol, 226-228). During the wars against the North the tribes conceived a 
communion or comradeship based on the resistance movement of the South. Despite internal 
fractions and disagreements in SPLM/A, the South became what Anderson coins an imagined 
community. The unity was carved in the actions of SPLM/A forces and supporters, in which most 
people one way or another was involved. It was exactly the juxtaposition between the developing 
North and the neglected South, which served as the dominant political ideology and created a 
comradeship amongst the diverse tribes. In sum, uniting against a common enemy created an 
imagined, limited and sovereign political community – a nation was imagined and a Southern 
identity originated. 
 
4.3. Farewell visions  
The following consists of a paragraph of my interview with Maror Rehan where he reflects on the 
visions of independence and the remaining progress of these visions. 
 
Interviewer: “Before independence came, do you think or do you feel that there was a clear 
political vision for an independent South Sudan?” (Maror Rehan interview, line 133-135) 
 
Maror Rehan: “Yes, there was a clear vision. Each citizen was expecting that South Sudan need to 
be independent so that: we can be able to rule ourselves, we can be the first class, nobody else can 
dominate us, no one else can put us to slavery. It was an idea that everybody was ready for because 
the Arab world may be Sudan now, the current Sudan. They don’t see Christian or maybe 
somebody black, dark like us, you know, like somebody who have a brain - something like that - no 
matter what you do”. (line 135-142) 
 
Interviewer: “So the vision was based on the fight for freedom?” (line 144) 
 
Maror Rehan: “Yes, freedom. Basically, that was the vision, and we want to share our whole 
resources equally. We want to have better school and so many things. We want to catch up with the 
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rest of the world”. (line 146-148) 
 
Interviewer: “Was there a political vision?” (line 150) 
 
Maror Rehan: “There was a political vision because when you see the backwardness of our 
people, majority of people don’t even know their age, especially the ones who were born in the '80s 
and back. They don’t know, why? Because we have a problem ...” (line 152-154) 
 
Interviewer: “The political vision was to develop?” (line 163) 
 
Maror Rehan: “Was to develop, make us better citizen, protective citizen, to contribute to the 
world and Southern Sudan - as first us”. (line 165-166) 
 
Interviewer: “Do you feel like the political vision has been implemented after independence?”  
(line 168) 
 
Maror Rehan: “No”. (line 171) 
 
Interviewer: “Can you elaborate?” (line 173) 
 
Maror Rehan: “I think people shift away from our goals or maybe strategy - a strategy that we get 
the Southern Sudan, after we get Southern Sudan we allocate resources based on the need; like 
hospitals, schools, road, water, then we move forward to agriculture and some other things. But that 
vision really ... it is just lost somewhere; it is just everybody by his own…..” continues. (line 175-
178) 
 
 
According to Lam Akol, there was a clear political vision prior to independence to create a multi-
party government whom together would formulate the constitution of the new state. The pre-
secession plan for independence was prepared by (all) twenty political parties and civil society 
organisations prepared at the “All Southern Sudanese Political Party Conference” 4 in October 
2010, prior to the referendum. The minutes from the conference illustrates a commitment for peace 
and reconciliation of SPLM and broad adherence to the principle of democracy, rule of law, 
protection of human rights and respect of a multiparty system in all the 20 political parties. It was 
decided that a transitional government consistent of all political parties, under the leadership of 
Salva Kiir should transpire in case of secession. Lam Akol explains: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For the communiqué adopted and issued by the conference, See annex 1: “Southern Sudanese United for Free, Fair an
d Transparent Referenda” 	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“We had a communiqué: we said that we will form a government - this language now 
being talked about - we will form a government of national unity that will be made up of 
all the political parties. The mission of that government is to write the constitution of the 
country, to work for nation building, and all these things. It was well agreed and we went 
to the referendum together campaigning for a separate South. Now, when the result was 
announced the SPLM said, 'No, there's nothing like that, we were elected in 2010 - for 
five years, we are to complete our term.' That was the end of it because 2010 election 
were within Sudan. Actually, we did not elect a president for an independent South Sudan 
- we did not. Salva was elected as the head of a regional government called Government 
of South Sudan, which is part of Sudan – it was not elected” (Dr. Lam Akol, 2015 
interview: 316-325). 
 
The above illustrates that SPLM terminated the agreement of a multiparty government after the 
referendum and instead resumes in power, referring to the 2010 election of Autonomous region 
of South Sudan.  Lam Akol states “So it is SPLM that killed that project” (Dr. Lam Akol, 2015 
interview: 332). The statements of Maror Rehan reflect that the people’s aspirations of an 
independent state and the political visions pre-independence were dissimilar to the political 
reality inaugurated with statehood. Accordingly, it was the hopes and dreams that independence 
would bring ‘a better tomorrow’ with social and economic development to benefit the people. 
Largely everyone in South Sudan has a personal relationship with the war-torn history, and 
therefore, most people directly or indirectly participated in the war and suffering that eventually 
made independence a reality. As a consequence, ‘the people’ were ready to reap the benefits – 
freedom, justice and equality, of independence. 
 
4.4. Ending the political setup 	  
Leading up to the political conflict was a “Discontent with lack of development, corruption within 
the party and the government” became public around 2012-2013 (Johnson, 2014a: 169). But more 
importantly, President Kiir sacked the cabinet and his vice-president in July 2013. The political 
conflict and intrastate war is therefore rooted in the political top of SPLM (Johnson, 2014b). 
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Johnson continues that President Kiir is a soldier rather than a politician, which arguably weakens 
the ruling coalition, and is exemplified in the readjustment of the 2012 oil-agreement in Khartoums 
favour (Johnson, 2014b: 7). Moreover, he side-lined the ‘Garang loyalists’, and inserted ‘his own’, 
sometimes outsiders of the party, and he moreover created a national army of Presidential Guards 
consisting of soldiers from his home area (Johnson, 2014b: 7). Many within the party felt SPLM 
lost direction after the independence referendum, lacking vision of development and nationalism, 
and called for “SPLM to renew its original commitment to the concepts of social justice, equality, 
democracy, and progress through a new constitutional arrangement for the nation” (Johnson, 2014b: 
4). The current political crisis of the SPLM/A, defined as intra-state conflict, is likely to reoccurring 
after the peace agreements are signed, and it therefore fit the conflict pattern of the 21st century 
(Heywood, 2014: 154). 
 
 
In conclusion, South Sudan came into being by democratic means but recent history 
demonstrations that the political vision, if ever present in the ruling coalition, altered once the 
rights of statehood were invoked. The vision of ‘a better tomorrow’ as reflected was replaced: 
 
“Yes, there was a clear vision. Each citizen was expecting that South Sudan need to be 
independent so that: we can be able to rule ourselves, we can be the first class, nobody 
else can dominate us, no one else can put us to slavery.” (line 135-139) 
 
The political visions were replaced as the SPLM terminated the agreement of a multiparty 
government in order to remain in power. Maror Rehan, Deng Bol and Lam Akol have reflected 
that a vision for secession always have been present amongst the people, but additionally has 
been vague and existed in opposition to the exiting regime. Subsequently, the political vision of 
a separate South materialised in what the south did not want rather than in a clear plan for the 
future. In sum, the pre-independence visions of the nation-state was seen to be dissimilar to the 
political reality inaugurated with statehood. The visions particular to the ruling elite of the 
SPLM will be elaborated in the beginning of Chapter 6. 
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Chapter	  5:	  The	  modern	  state	  project	  in	  South	  Sudan	  
Analysis	  one	  	  	  
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter explains how parts of the SPLM leadership aimed to create an independent South 
Sudan after the CPA’s made this an option, and investigates how they succeeded in their efforts. It 
explores how modern statehood was invoked in the effort to create a nation-state and how the 
international community, led by the UNDP instigated a state building project starting basically from 
scratch. It will then argue that modern statehood has come to be perceived as the only legitimate 
political organisation, and therefore the model has become the blueprint of successful society, 
viewed as a point of departure for social and economic development of fragile states. Moreover, the 
analysis will depict that the modern state project has an inbuilt bias stemming from the long running 
Western nation building and state formation process, which challenges a copy paste in a non-
Western setting. It will then elaborate on the way in which processes of modern statehood in the 
blueprint edition has proved incapable of eliminating existing competing logics, and thus largely 
failed to build the strong, transparent and democratic institutions it set out to and with what 
consequences. This section of the analysis will therefore conclude that the UNDP model seems 
unfit and possibly incompatible with the realities of the young and still developing South Sudan, 
and in conclusion asks whether the modern state project in fact was preparing its own failure? The 
Chapter consists of the subchapters ‘Instigating sovereignty’, ‘The idea of the state and its 
reifications’, ‘State building in South Sudan’, ‘Imagined communities and conflicting logics’ and 
finally ‘The façade of statehood’.  
 
5.2. Instigating sovereignty 
Central in the hearts and minds of many South Sudanse is the chock following the sudden death of 
the ‘Father of the Nation’ John Garang / Dr. John, shortly after the successful results of the 
comprehensive peace agreements (CPA’s) in 2005 between SPLM/A and GoS. The CPAs were 
created with the assumption that Garang would remain leader and thus become head of government 
during the interim period 2005 until the independence referendum in 2011 (Johnson, 2014a). Deng 
Bol explains how the loss of Dr. John was “like loosing a flash drive” (Deng Bol Arui Bol, 
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interview: 37), and his sudden and chocking death created a power vacuum inside the SPLM, which 
became preoccupied with the future and survival of the party rather than the future of the region. 
The CPA’s were intended by the warring parties, SPLM led by Garang and GoS, to keep the 
autonomous South part of Sudan, whereas others including Garang’s successor, President Kiir, that 
the South should secede from Sudan. Becoming independent thus became Kiir’s policy (Johnson, 
2014b; De Waal, 2015). The discourse of unity however, lingered in the SPLM. According to Lam 
Akol, who has a long history in the top of the SPLM, the discourse of ‘a united Sudan’ was a 
tactical position: ”If we want to get the support of the world the language is unity” (Dr. Lam Akol, 
2015 interview: 247). He continues: 
 
”We would have developed what we perceive as the South, but the problem was we were 
pretending that we are for unity of Sudan. Nobody had power to come out to say, 'I'm 
going to work for a separate South.'” (Dr. Lam Akol, 2015 interview: 286-288). 
 
As the probability and aspiration of secession increased the government began to prepare for the 
possibility of statehood. They resumed monopoly of the means of violence and territorial control of 
the South and thereby adhered to the fundamentals of a Weberian definition of statehood. This 
entailed “keeping SPLM’s internal division quiet in a show of unity prior to the independence 
referendum” (Johnson, 2014: 168). Also, splinter groups of SPLA were encouraged to resume to the 
national army, although they never fully became an integrated part of the SPLA. Nevertheless, by 
the referendum in 2011, Southern Sudan possessed a united national army large enough to deter 
potential aggression from Sudan while they abided to the fundamentals of modern statehood: 
possessing territorial control and monopoly on the means of violence. 
The above shows a change of policy from united Sudan towards a sovereign nation-state. The 
Southern elite thus initiated Independence, and the project was carried out with help from 
international donors. The following will introduce the notion of the ‘Weberian state’ and afterwards 
account for the UNDP state building project exercised in South Sudan in preparation of the national 
sovereignty. 
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5.3. The idea of the state and its reifications 
It is usually suggested that when Max Weber argued "a state is a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" 
and thus, "the modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination" over and 
within a given territory (Weber, 1919: 1-5). In this manner ‘the state’ becomes the organization that 
succeeds in holding the exclusive right to use, threaten, or authorize physical force against the 
residents of its territory. Such a monopoly, according to Weber, must occur via a process of 
legitimation, that is some process of mutual recognition and acceptance moving from force to 
domination. But the Weberian framework for understanding state formation is more open than often 
assumed as it speaks about ‘any organisation’ that are legitimate can become or take on the mantel 
of what we usually refer to as the state. In this way Weber keeps it open who could become 
legitimate – it could be a party, a business organisation (Tilly, 1985), a gang (Rodgers, 2006) or a 
liberation movement like SPLA for that matter. But often this openness is foreclosed by a priory 
assuming it to be ‘the state’ whereby we reify and reproduce the idea of the state as the best frame 
and political organisation of any community. On the whole, the Weberian state with its “dual-sided 
process of internal “pacification” and external “warfare”” which developed the modern state, 
(Andersen et al., 2007: 7). This has since become a universal ‘recipe’ for a successful and modern 
community, exemplified in the recent popularity of the security-development nexus. 
 
5.4. State building in South Sudan 
Implicit in state building and state formation processes is the underpinning of the state as the en-
framer of social life (Andersen et al., 2007). This is investigated in the following, which explores 
how the state building project took form in the newly independent South Sudan. I will begin by 
investigating the nature of the state project, and then understand how it fits the social context of 
South Sudan. Finally, this Chapter will investigate the role of the state building project in the 
collapse of the state and nation. 
 
State building processes are increasingly taken as prerequisite of social and economic development 
of fragile states. In (post)conflict countries such as South Sudan the security-development nexus 
can be added to this with tremendous importance for progress of building the state. As a 
	   	   	  	  
	   47	  
consequence, the progress endorsed in South Sudan before the SPLM-SPLM-IO conflict came to a 
halt. Until December 2013 South Sudan was making ”steady progress in key development areas”, 
but the conflict will roll back “years of development achievements and hard won peace, and causing 
increased poverty as well as long term insecurity and vulnerability to future chocks”  (UNDP, South 
Sudan Annual report 2014: 4-5). The coming section will examine how the modern state project 
was introduced in the world’s youngest state after its independence in July 2011 in order to 
comprehend the breakdown of the state only two years later. 
 
The UN action paper for independent South Sudan is known as the ‘United Nations Development 
Assistance Framework for the Republic of South Sudan’ (UNDAF). UNDAF is a UN policy paper 
made in cooperation between the Government and the UN Country Team (UNCT) and is therefore 
an external yet internally aspired strategy. The UNDAF policy paper was made in cooperation with 
the ‘South Sudan Development Programme’ (SSDP) developed by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning in August 2011. The Development Plan centres on (1) Governance, (2) 
Economic Development, (3) Social and Human Development, (4) Conflict Prevention and Security 
under the theme: “realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all” (SSDP, 2011). 
These pillars are kept central in all UN policy papers concerning the assistance of constructing the 
state. The fundamental nature of state building processes is reflected in the strategies implemented 
by the UNDP to assist the young state: 
”In the critical first two years following the independence of the Republic of South 
Sudan, the UN Country Team will stand with the world’s newest nation as it puts in place 
the building blocks of statehood, in order to tackle one of the most challenging 
development contexts in Africa” (UNDAF 2011-2013: 8).  
The United Nations Developing Programme (UNDP) has been present in the area of South Sudan 
for the last 40 years. However, in the post independence period the UNDP has centred but has post 
independence centred its efforts on sustainable development and inclusive economic growth 
through the build up of a modern state: 
 
“State building is at the heart of UNDP’s commitment to South Sudan. It is supporting 
the country as it builds democratic institutions to establish sustainable, accountable and 
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transparent governance and rule of law systems, by committing significant human, 
technical and financial resources” (UNDP, South Sudan annual report, 2014: 22). 
In other words, an inclusive, cohesive and responsive state, which encompasses democratic 
mechanisms for participation and political debate, is seen as the point of departure for a prosperous 
society. Consequently, UNDP tailors its support to the post-conflict setting through its Democratic 
Governance and Stabilisation Programme where democratic institutions and sustainable, 
accountable and transparent governance as well as rule of law systems are put in place5. It is thus 
central to the UNDP to “support government to identify its core functions”, which include 
management of public resources, rule of law and law enforcement, as well as public administration” 
(UNDP, 2011a). The efforts of UNDP are present in all levels of capacity: the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional levels and in all levels of government in South Sudan from the national state level and 
down to the county level. This is to ensure a comprehensive formation, which in all practices abides 
to the standard of modern statehood, for instance by decreasing the rampant corruption amongst 
government officials, which the country suffers greatly from. 
 
   
Diagram 2. Reflects the levels of the capacity building conducted by the UN in South Sudan. 
 
According to the UNDP, governance and effective public service are key in assessing the 
effectiveness of the new government: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/in_depth/ retrieved 22nd Of June. 	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“The success of the new Government of South Sudan will depend on its ability to deliver 
basic services in an environment of security and the rule of law. This means the 
Government must manage its finances, prepare budgets, and ensure public money is 
spent according to approved plans” (UNDP, building human capacity- building strong 
institutions, 2011a). 
The South Sudan Development Plan was one of the initial programs set out by the independent state 
and is not surprisingly produced in the same discourse of modern statehood, as proposed by the UN 
departments presented above. The report addresses concrete issues of the state and propose how the 
obstacles ought, should and must be handled in order to improve economic, social and human 
development for all. For instance it states: 
“To achieve macroeconomic stability and long-run fiscal sustainability, it is important 
that a considerable proportion of our oil revenue should be put aside in savings“ (South 
Sudan Development Plan, 2011: 30). 
This portrays how GOSS succeeded in implementing the discourse of modern statehood prescribed 
by the UN and international donors. Nevertheless, as we will se in Chapter six, the idealistic 
discourse hardly reflect reality as South Sudan continues to be macroeconomic instable and increase 
debt. 
As stated initially, the SPLM-SPLM-IO conflict turned the state building and development 
assistance into humanitarian relief and therefore put an end to the making of the state. Denmark for 
instance, continues to support South Sudan but funding is allocated towards the refugee camps of 
IDP’s rather then development assistance and the state building6. The Guardian mentions how the 
state building was focused on technicalities such as infrastructure and services rather than good 
governance, evenly distributing of resources and reconciliation (The Guardian, 2014). Nevertheless, 
it is important to keep in mind that we are not dealing with a state formation process, rather, the 
build up of the state had six months to prepare for independence and additionally two years to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Stated by a representative in a meeting I attended in the Danish Foreign Ministry after my visit in Juba. 	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flourish until it was interrupted and erupted into severe political conflict and intra-state war which 
brutally ended the internal as well as external state building efforts. 
 
In sum, this section portrayed that the UN engagement and state building policies are comparable to 
the Weberian ideals of statehood. Moreover, the policies have a democratic and good governance 
focus, to increase economic, human and social development of the highly underdeveloped state. 
According to this framework, the success of South Sudan as a new state depends on its devotion to 
democratic institutions and sustainable, accountable and transparent governance as well as rule of 
law systems. Moreover it then depicted that the Government has adopted the idealistic discourse of 
modern statehood advised by the United Nation. It ends on a concluding note and asks whether the 
discourse of the modern state project reflects what in reality takes place in the state apparatus? 
This paper has previously argued that the interpretation of Weber’s ideal and legitimate governance 
combined with the success of Western capitalist nation-state have resulted in a political blueprint of 
statehood known as ‘the modern state’. The notion contends that consolidated states are built if and 
when Governments follow this democratic good governance recipe of state building. Critiques 
problematize its embedded universality, which always already inhabit specific features, functions 
and forms of government, which consequently easily condemn deviating practices as ‘failing’ or 
‘fragile’. This universality is therefore referred to as the ‘blueprint of statehood’. The state project 
in South Sudan as presented above is a contemporary example of the blueprint. The coming will 
investigate how the blueprint takes out in the reality. 
 
5.5. Imagined communities and conflicting logics 
Along with independence and the instigated state project the official nation-state logic became 
authorised. Nevertheless this thesis argues that the nation-state logic is not the only one. Rather it is 
one of three disputing sets of logic in South Sudan: (1) the nation-state logic, (2) the tribal logic, 
and (3) clientalist-patronage. The three sets of logics oppose one another, and the latter two are 
likely to contradict and threaten the modern state project and its existence as an imagined 
community. 
As announced in the previous section the state project is centred on democratic institutions, good 
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governance and rule of law, which is reflected in the nation-state logic and portrayed by the UNDP: 
“The success of the new Government of South Sudan will depend on its ability to deliver 
basic services in an environment of security and the rule of law. This means the 
Government must manage its finances, prepare budgets, and ensure public money is 
spent according to approved plans” (UNDP, building human capacity- building strong 
institutions, 2011a). 
As it is the nature of the nation-state logic that viable institutions, and sustainable, accountable and 
transparent governance and rule of law systems are followed, the nation-state logic cannot function 
if competing logics undermines it. The success of the state project therefore depends on the success 
of the nation-state logic to prevail and eventually eliminate competing logics. However, the 
following will depict how the assumption that the nation-state logic automatically will prevail over 
existing logics is a tremendous inborn weakness of the state recipe. 
In South Sudan, two imagined communities coexist: the nation and the tribe. Echoing Renan and 
Anderson, the nation of South Sudan was created in the opposition to the government of Sudan 
(GOS), through suffering and insurgency, which unified the Southern tribes in their sacrifice. The 
resistance led by the SPLM/A was nevertheless not utter solidarity and sacrifice: 
 
“The SPLA, instead of being a genuine national liberation movement, turned into an 
agent of plunder, pillage, and destructive conquest. … The SPLA became like an army 
of occupation in areas it controlled and from which the people were running away” 
(Adwok Nyaba in Pinaud, 2014: 197). 
Regards of the brutal nature of the movement, it was the SPLM/A who freed the people from the 
common aggressor, Luka Biong expresses: 
 
“the very fact that you have your virtues as a liberator and you mobilize the people, you 
sacrifice a lot, so you have a lot of - huge political capital when you are a liberation 
movement” (Luka Biong, 101-103). 
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Reflecting Benedict Anderson, the discourse of freedom created a halo of interconnectedness 
around the Southern tribes, which eventually shaped its nation-ness. Subsequently, “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2006: 6) came 
into existence. The presence of nation-ness became the first step towards an independent South 
Sudan. The nation can thus be traced back to the Juba Conference in 1947, where the chiefs of the 
South first gathered, and therefore the nation is a fairly new constellation in South Sudan. The tribe 
on the other hand, has been present for centuries, and its power as an imagined community is 
therefore resilient. Maror Rehan exemplifies how loyalty predominates in the tribe: 
 
“Instead to serve the national - the country, we're serving our own tribe better than the 
country. The country is left behind, so nobody loves the country, everybody is loyal to his 
tribe, and the country is left alone” (Maror Rehan, interview: 38-41). 
 
Rehan’s reflections of how the tribal imagined community prevails over the nation as an imagined 
community and depicts how people still find allegiance in their tribes and clans rather than in the 
nation-state after its inauguration. Lam Akol equally describes the bond of brotherhood which exist 
in the tribes: 
They go (the elites edt.) and mobilize them to fight their wars and the easiest thing is to 
say, 'We as a tribe are under threat,' and they will rise up because the culture of these 
tribes is that if your brother is harmed you come to his rescue, if your brother is killed 
you kill in his place. When somebody, a manipulator comes to say, 'Look, the other tribe - 
they want to dominate us, they want to do this, they have done this,' immediately they get 
the support, but the tribes on their own would not come and fight each other” (Dr. Lam 
Akol, 2015 interview: 515-525). 
 
In sum, contrary to the predictions of the state project, the tribe – not the state is the cultural 
legitimate en-framer of social life in South Sudan. Rehan exemplifies ”if you go around the country 
they don't even know constitution of South Sudan, they don’t even know how South Sudan flag look 
like: they don't have any idea” (Maror 292-294). Moreover, with the blueprint of the modern state 
project followed an expectation that good governance would prevail once the institutions were 
installed and the political actors were instructed. This however, has so far not been the case. Instead, 
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the tribal logic contradicts and therefore erodes the modern state project and its nation-state logic. 
Moreover, a third set of logics prevails in the young state: the economic distributive system of 
patronage. The logic of patronage will be explored in chapter six in order to understand the 
economic distributive logics around state resources and it will investigate how and whether client-
patronage has jeopardised the logics of the nation-state and the modern state project. 
This section has thus far concluded that the nation-state logic installed along with the blueprint state 
project has failed to eliminate the pre-existing and contradictory logics as tribal and patronage 
logics continue to exist in parallel to the state project. Moreover, the opposing practices erode the 
state project, and as a consequence the state has been unable to exercise its stateness through 
governance (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001). Maror Rehan reflects on the loss of governance after the 
independence of South Sudan: 
”I think people shift away from our goals or maybe strategy - a strategy that we get the 
Southern Sudan, after we get Southern Sudan we allocate resources based on the need; 
like hospitals, schools, road, water, then we move forward to agriculture and some other 
things. But that vision really ... it is just lost somewhere; it is just everybody by his own” 
(Maror Rehan, interview: 175-178). 
 
The outbreak of the political crisis and loss of monopoly on the means of violence, the government 
has largely disregarded the governance dimension of stateness. However, the failures occurred from 
the inception of statehood: 
”It (the South Sudanese state, edt.) is making the same mistake, yes. And the reason it is 
making the same mistake is that when we came in we refused to put in technocrats into 
the positions. Instead, we put the same guys who were in the bush in the same position: 
as ministers, as directors and all that. So they don't know anything apart from the war” 
(William Deng Deng, interview 2015: 225-228). 
 
While the government has neglected governance, it has instead focused on the symbolic 
reproduction of state authority. This is seen in the billboards hanging in Juba declaring, “We are 
one Nation” and “Annual Veteran Day”, the countless SPLA soldiers visible in Juba, the many 
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Generals7 wearing their stars and uniform until their last breath, the President’s official speech after 
each failed peace negotiation with SPLM-IO, the annual Independency day celebration, and the 
omnipresent state-emblems8, which all points towards a nationalist sentimental discourse, much 
easier for the government to invoke than actual political governance. Therefore, to vindicate for its 
failing results and to remain an imagined community, government leaders apply the state language 
of authority and insinuate the suffering of the past through a dichotomy of untied Sudan versus 
South Sudan: repression / freedom, poverty / possibility, violence / brotherhood, North / South etc. 
An SPLA General declared to me in the Ministry of Defence in Juba: “thank God we got our 
independence!”. While liberation from the Northern threat cannot be repudiated, the people of 
South Sudan are nevertheless still awaiting for ‘the promised land’ as they are stuck outside the 
security and development nexus. In sum, the resemblance of autocracy between the previous and 
current leadership is striking and it continues to grow closer: “They say oppressor has no colour” 
(Lam Akol, 485). 
 
5.6. The façade of statehood 
As explained in the analytical framework, the fundamental discrepancy between the European state-
formation and its contemporary blueprint version is the (dis)possession of monopoly on the means 
of violence. Whereas the European state-formation held monopoly on the means of violence as its 
point of departure and only afterwards initiated a juridification and democratisation process, the 
post-colonial state-builder invoked statehood the other way around, in which juridification and 
political authority precedes an actual state-monopoly of violence. Like the European state formation 
South Sudan is shaped by war. However whereas the European state was created in a state 
formation, South Sudan was build, and therefore lacks a state formation process as defined by 
Norbert Elias in which structures and social behaviour are interwoven, and therefore rather than 
being anchored in empirical statehood; a ‘weak state’, or rather an image of a state is built. This 
‘negative sovereignty’ thus creates an inconsistency between state institution, image and social 
practice, which subsequently holds hostage the political actor between the competing logics and 
audience as presented by Jung 2008. As a consequence, the modern state project ends up as ‘a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 South Sudan is the country with the largest number of Generals in the army, only overtaken by Russia. 
8 Based on authors own experiences in Juba, March 2015. 
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façade’ concealing the reality of the informal institutions that prevails behind the façade of modern 
state institutions: “For all these actors, the image of the state serves as a central normative reference 
while they follow their own goal on the ground” (Jung, 2008: 40). This notion is reflected by Deng 
Deng, when Army Generals despite limited qualifications are appointed ministers and Directors. De 
Waal explains how in his opinion the young state is a façade for actors to peruse personal agendas: 
“Accordingly, neo-patrimonial systems have persisted in South Sudan for long. In a neo-
patrimonial system of governance, political office is used primarily for personal and 
factional advantage … The South Sudanese version has particular features. First, it is 
kleptocratic, both in the everyday sense that national leaders use every opportunity to 
steal public funds” (De Waal, 2014: 348). “Kiir’s main instrument of governance was 
permitting members of the elite to join the kleptocratic club” (De Waal, 2014: 361). 
In accordance, I asked Maror Rehan how big he assumes corruption to be South Sudan, 
he replied: 
 
I think it's big because we came out from war. You cannot create a class of millionaire in 
just six years-seven year. How did they get that money? How much salary that person 
earn, whether he work in private sector? What created private sector? How did this 
people create private sector? Because we all came out from the bush, and we don’t even 
have any money or any system. You cannot become a millionaire in just two years - one 
year! That means there is corruption. And corruption is not only in money – corruption is 
a system, you hire the wrong people - that’s corruption. Yes. This people can be loyal to 
you later on, if you want to run for office they vote for you or maybe because there's 
certain idea in your money”  (Maror Rehan, interview: 595-602). 
 
The above reflects how the state is misused by the political actor in pursue of personal agendas and 
therefore becomes a platform for competing logics to flourish. South Sudan is therefore an image of 
the state rather than an empirical statehood, and so the modern state project counteracts and 
jeopardise the nation-state logic it initially attempted to create and strengthen. The state project in 
South Sudan is hereby preparing its own breakdown. This echoes Abrams’s critical account of 
statehood in which the state is a masked “symbolic identity progressively divorced from practice as 
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an illusory account of practice” (Abrams, 1988: 58), in endeavour to façade political practice: “The 
state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which 
prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (Abrams, 1977: 82). 
 
Conclusion of Chapter five 
Chapter five illustrated that modern statehood was attempted in South Sudan after independence in 
2011, through the attempt to build a nation-state. It argued that the project was driven by GOSS but 
assisted by the UNDP. Moreover it depicted how two imagined communities coexist in South 
Sudan: the tribe and the nation-state. Nonetheless, only the tribe is legitimately anchored in the 
traditional local community. Chapter five additionally argued that despite the predictions of the 
state project, a set of contradictory logics continue to exist in the world’s youngest state: (1) the 
nation-state logic, (2) the tribal logic, and (3) the client-patron network. It described that the latter 
two propose a local social and distributive network parallel to the nation-state logic, from where 
their existence and effects are concealed as ‘public secrets’. Consequently, the society of South 
Sudan has proven resilient against the logic provided by the modern state project, which haft left the 
nation-state logic nothing more than a blueprint and a façade of a viable state, whose empirical 
reality is based on negative sovereignty without real governance and state-ness. The analysis 
therefore argued that the modern state project and the good governance state building project was 
unfit with the empirical reality of South Sudan. In sum, modern statehood has failed to eliminate its 
competing and contradictory logics, and without intending to it ends up assisting them by being 
their normative reference and financial raison d’etre. This creates a negative spiral that hollows, 
dismantles and potentially threatens the survival of the state. The analysis maintained that the state 
building ‘Amo bake’n’shake’ led by UN unintentionally has counteracted itself and herein has 
played a crucial role in the breakdown of the young state. In conclusion, the blueprint vision of the 
embryonic state fit the idea of the Westphalian state imaginary prescribed by the nation state logic, 
however, empirical reality of the state is dominated by the tribal and the client-patron logic. 
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Chapter 6: Patronage and Clientalist networks in South Sudan 
 
Analysis	  two	  	  
 
John Garang:”There’ll never be a shortage of people to take up arms and defend the South but who 
is ready to share power and look after the people?” (African Confidential 2013). 
 
Chapter six contains of the second and final analysis, and will build on the findings from the former 
Chapters. Chapter five concluded that three contradictory sets of logics exist in the world’s 
youngest state: (1) the nation-state logic, (2) the tribal logic, and (3) the logic of clientalist 
patronage networks. I argue that the last two logics create the conditions for a home-grown social 
distributive network and is resilient to the first logic (the nation-state logic) which is supported by 
the internationally promoted state building project. As a consequence, the state building project 
helps to financially maintain the two conflicting logics, at the expense of a viable state-project. 
Finally, it concluded that the endeavour to build a state from scratch is a blueprint vision rather than 
a feasible project. 
 
Chapter six will begin by depicting how a dominant class historically was shaped in the poor area of 
Southern Sudan, and argue that the elites are presently sustained through the third logic; namely the 
existence and reproduction of clientalistic patronage networks. It will then explore how the 
clientalistic patronage networks are reproduced by excessive rent seeking in and around the natural 
resource endowed state and scrutinise the macroeconomic consequences this entails. And finally 
conduct a political settlement analysis in order to explore the consequences a new and natural 
resource endowed developing state is facing. The Chapter consists of the following subchapters: 
‘Shaping a dominant class’, ‘Elites & Clientalistic Patronage networks’, ‘Rent seeking for 
sovereignty’, ‘The resource curse’, ‘Volatility of income’, ‘Dutch Disease, ‘Observing through the 
lens of the Political Settlement’, ‘The breakdown of the state and nation’ and finally ‘Chicken 
games’. 
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6.1. Shaping a dominant class 
The formation of the dominant class in South Sudan originated in wartime predation amongst 
commanders of the SPLA during the second civil war lasting from 1983-2005. It then founded its 
hegemony through seize and embezzlement of resources that accordingly created a “military elite” 
(Pinaud, 2014: 193). 
“The SPLA, instead of being a genuine national liberation movement, turned into an 
agent of plunder, pillage, and destructive conquest. The strong link between being a 
soldier in a national liberation movement and the solidarity with the people...was 
completely absent.... The SPLA became like an army of occupation in areas it 
controlled and from which the people were running away” (Adwok Nyaba in Pinaud, 
2014: 197). 
Not only did this eliminate the development of any civic accountability mechanism, but also it 
created a situation in which the economic gain from joining the SPLA was large in the subsistence 
economy of Southern Sudan. Maror Rehan (Director of Benefits in the Ministry of Veteran Affairs) 
suggested it created certain dilemmas reflected on this issue: ”the liberation absorbed so many 
people, criminal, or whatever. Now, when these people, now criminal, were absorbed in the army 
and become big bosses” (Maror Rehan, Interview, 247-248). The emergence of this dominant class 
of SPLA cadres that were quite diverse and joined based on many different logics will be called the 
military elite and referred to simply as ‘the elite’ in the remaining Chapter. 
The access to resources had existed in the army during the war ended after the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreements (CPA’s) were signed. From then on it was SPLM and not SPLA that had access 
to resources through the state apparatus. However, to clarify it should be noted here that the 
militarised set up of the state of South Sudan as well as its militarised birth has created a situation in 
which the SPLM and SPLA remain closely affiliated and in reality works like a unit. For instance, 
budgets allocation is made, but after the military has been accommodated, “The Army Generals 
wheels in and dictate the budgets” (Greg Larson in De Waal, 2014b: 39). The militant history of the 
country constitutes a political reality consisting of constant shifts of loyalty amongst militia and 
SPLA commanders: “Coalitions form and break for many reasons including but not limited to: 
Tribal affiliations, turf gains, recruitment drives, and resource control” (Enough: South Sudan’s 
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militias). This means in order to maintain allegiance of the many splinter groups, GOSS is forced to 
let Generals dictate national budgets and through which they allocate to their clientalistic networks 
based constituencies and ethnic backers. This moreover explains the high military expenditure, 
William Deng Deng, Chairman of the national DDR commission reflects: 
 
”I think it's big. They keep saying it is 40% - for me I think it is more than that. They tell 
you 40% and 40% of how many soldiers. It depends on the number of soldiers so I 
assume it is more than 40%. How more I don't know, but it is more 40%. Some people 
say, 'Oh, it is not 40%; it is less.' But I said, 'Okay, if it is less then, why are we not 
building the schools? Why are we not building the roads? Why are we not building 
dispensaries” (William Deng Deng, interview 121-125). 
 
As a consequence of the military history and continued importance, the SPLA and SPLM never 
truly separated, and remain intertwined. Professor Luka Biong explains: ”SPLA came with this 
military mind-set of how to govern the people so everything was based on military structure” (Luka 
Biong, Interview: 61-62). Lam Akol Chairman in SPLM-DC supplements: 
 
“because the army was not separated from the SPLM, when the SPLM quarrelled the 
army also quarrelled. When the SPLM got divided, the army got divided - this is why 
there is war today (Lam Akol 354-356). 
In sum, the close connection between the SPLM and SPLA remain because the elites were founded 
in preceding war predation and is now maintained in clientalistic patronage networks working in 
and through the state in order to maintain monopoly of the means of violence. 
 
Elites & Clientalistic Patronage networks 
If indeed the elite (political and military) is reproduced through clientalistic patronage networks, 
where gifts and political corruption continues to be the prime mechanism of elites and class 
formation what are then the consequences? As in most African countries, “class relations, at 
bottom, are determined by relations of power, not production” (Sklar in Pinaud, 2014: 209). As a 
consequence, the informal institution of clientalistic patronage in the young state is thriving. Maror 
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Rehan explains: 
“And corruption is not only in money – corruption is a system, you hire the wrong 
people – that’s corruption. Yes. This people can be loyal to you later on, if you want to 
run for office they vote for you or maybe because there's certain idea in your money”  
(Maror Rehan, interview: 595-602). 
What does it mean that “there's certain idea in your money”? In my understanding of the networks 
that revolve around ‘giving’, it is central in the clientalist patronage system and because the gift is 
bought with public funds the ‘nation-state logic’ prescribes it as closely associated to corruption. 
Nevertheless, as concluded earlier, the nation state logic has failed to become the dominant form of 
logic. Subsequently the act of giving based on the public tab is not associated with corruption but is 
seen as an appropriate code of conduct in the clientalist patronage system. My personal stay in Juba 
reflects these processes quite clear9. 
While clientalistic patronage practices are seen as unrelated to corruption, an awareness of public 
shaming of corruption takes place nonetheless. This reflects the perception that “there is corruption 
here. Nobody would deny that” (Maror Rehan, interview: 587), though it is referred to as it is 
conducted by others. This inconsistency comprises a paradox similar to Taussig’s public secrets. 
This secret covers the awareness that corrupt practices make up the system of clientalist patronage 
networks, and therefore is a system that everyone is involved in. Deng Bol, the Chairman of the Red 
Army Foundation illuminates the logic of clientalist patronage network: ”Sometimes people come 
up because they think that: Oh, when it is my uncle who is president this country will belong to us 
and now it will be our time to eat - this is the mentality” (Deng Bol Arui Bol Interview, line 135-
137). He then continues: 
“You think it will be our time to eat, we will eat together, it is our presidency, and it is 
our this or this and this. This is why people are going to the bush, but if they knew that 
what they will eat will not come from the presidency they will know that that guy is only 
administering our work, and our work will come to us in form of roads, schools, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Ministry of Veteran Affairs accommodated all of my expenses and furthermore provided me with pocket money. 
I perceive this as part of the client patronage system between my friend and someone in the Ministry. Nobody stated 
that I should write or act in a particular manner but seen in a South Sudan logic of patronage, which differs from the 
logic of academic work even by a master student, giving itself, triggers certain expectations in exchange. 
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hospitals, police, and all these” (Deng Bol Arui Bol, Interview: 137-141). 
This reflects a system that is build up around clientalist patronage practices where being head of 
Government gives direct access to power and resources for the president and his tribe10. Maror adds 
the system of corruption by saying that: ”It is very difficult to find a job because nobody can be able 
to hire them. You gotta know somebody – ‘not what you know but whom you know’” (Maror 
Rehan, Interview, 519-520). De Waal argues: 
 
“While most international partners operated on the assumption that corruption, 
patronage and a cash-in-hand system of public spending were distortions of the 
governmental system, which would in due course display the appropriate signs of 
institutional development, in reality the kleptocracy is the system. It was the few and 
fragile bubbles of technocratic integrity that were the distortion” (De Waal, 2014b: 39). 
… And: “In fact, corruption is the system. Kiir’s main instrument of governance 
was permitting members of the elite to join the kleptocratic club” (De Waal, 
2014a: 361). 
This shows how corruption and clientalistic systems are not only part of the system but indeed 
constitutes it. It is a system where elites are constructed and reconstructed through the means of 
calculated returns of loyalty, power, prestige and social capital of gifts and gift giving amongst 
peers (Pinaud, 2014). 
In conclusion, we have seen so far that the patron-clientalism constitutes the economic system in 
and around the state apparatus. It is therefore a socio-economic distribution system institution 
between elites their ethnic constituencies. 
 
Rent seeking for sovereignty 
Central in the wars leading up to the secession of the South was the question of resource 
endowments. Specifically, the large possession of crude oil, of which approximately 75 percent of 
Sudan’s beholding was found in the South, was vital. Protection of resources was key to the birth of 
SPLM/A and it continued to fuel the conflict between the central Government and the South (Patey, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 According to ‘Global Witness’ the elite has embezzled US$4 billion from 2005-2014 (Pinaud, 2014: 193) 
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2014). And as of today, oil continues to be vital. GOSS argued in the South Sudan Development 
Plan (SSDP): “about 98% of GOSS revenues are currently from oil” (SSDP, 2011: 123). As seen in 
Chapter three, Beblawi defined rents as “the income derived from the gift of nature” (Beblawi, 
1990: 49). Hence, a state like South Sudan that derives around 98 % of its revenues from oil and 
have few citizens involved in rent generating and more in the distribution, South Sudan is a rentier 
state. 
 
Chapter six has thus far explained how SPLA commanders during the second civil war founded the 
elite of South Sudan. It then depicted how the elite after independence has been maintained through 
patronage networks taking place in the young sovereign and natural resource abundant state. It 
therefore illustrated the essentiality of gifts in peruse of social capital, loyalty and power, and 
argued gifts are financed with public means.  
 
In a rentier economy such as South Sudan where natural resources accounts for an excessive 
percentage of the national revenue, rent seeking is directed towards the coffers of the state that 
formally should capture natural resource rents. Resources are hereby allocated in accordance to the 
logic of clientalistic-patronage, rather than the state building project as anticipated by the nation-
state logic. In this arrangement, the economic distribution of the clientalistic patronage networks 
becomes tremendously expensive for the state (De Wall, 2015). Along with independence was 
Southern annual oil revenue doubled (De Waal, 2014a: 353), which doubled the size of the pie 
available for distribution. Consequently, it doubled the possible output of rent seeking stemming 
from the networks, and put to rest long-term and noble development strategies and policies such as 
the South Sudan Development Plan. Could it be that rent seeking and control over the political 
economy was in fact one of the underlying reasons behind secession of the South? The excessive 
rent seeking taking place in around the state as a consequence of the dominant clientalistic 
patronage network, as elaborated above, undermines democratic and good governance process and 
decreases the social contract and bargaining power between citizens and the state, and therefore 
reduce accountability and governance. As a consequence, governance of South Sudan has 
deteriorated since independence. 
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6.2. The resource curse 
Phenomena such as the Resource Curse and rentierism defined as the negative effects of being a 
rentier state are tough to analyse because they cannot be disaggregated from the complex macro-
economic constellation in which they are shaped. Moreover, there is no evidence that explains the 
methodological correlations between resource abundance and bad political economy outcomes, and 
therefore it is suggested that the resource curse is a matter of institutional (in)capacity. As argued in 
the analytical framework, the resource curse consists of elements that in combination make 
resource-endowed countries “perform badly” (Sachs and Warner, 2001: 828) in comparison to non-
resource endowed. According to Professor Luka Biong the recourse curse affects South Sudan: 
 
“What I’m saying, these are very clear symptoms of the resource curse, whether in terms of 
Dutch Disease or in terms of rent seeking or in terms of volatility of the oil revenue… South 
Sudan is a clear case of resource curse and weak institutions” (Luka Biong, interview, 72-
78).  
 
South Sudan is a victim of the curse and suffers from volatility of income, Dutch Disease i.e. 
‘crowding out effects’ and deindustrialisation processes, which will be investigated in the coming 
sections. 
 
Volatility of income 
The rentier nature of the economy makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices and 
supply and demand of commodities. Especially volatile commodity prices create an instable macro-
economy. To accommodate bursts and booms the Government has passed the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act 2012. As seen in Diagram 3, the government until the oil halt in 2012 adjusted 
spending to the available revenue income. It clear exceeded spending in relation to the planned 
expenditure but this mattered little as revenues were available due to extremely high oil prices 
exceeded 100 UDS/b as seen in Diagram 4. 
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Diagram 3 reflects that expenditures (in SDG billion) are driven by revenues, not approved budget. (Source: World 
Bank, Public Expenditures in South Sudan, p. 4. In De Waal (2014)). 
 
 
The extreme dependence on revenues from oil suggests that the Government had a hard time 
readjusting spending in times of bursts in price developments. 
 
The Government took the bold decision in January 2012 to bring oil production to a halt due to 
disputes with Sudan over oil fees. The oil halt was conducted in order to put an economic pressure 
on the Government of Sudan as the South had “sufficiently cash reserves to last eight months” (De 
Waal, 2014a: 363). The national shut down of oil production nonetheless lasted sixteen months, 
until April 2013. It had devastating consequences for the national economy, as this meant virtually 
no income. The oil halt created a situation of self-perpetuated income volatility with grave political-
economy consequences on the clientalistic political settlement, which will be analysed in section 
6.3. Eventually, the Government signed a similar, in which Sudan charges 24,1 USD/b in oil fees 
(Daily Nation). 
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Diagram 4 illustrates the high oil prices prior to the oil halt. (Index Mundi). 
 
Dutch Disease 
 As elaborated in Chapter three, the Dutch disease11 is the mechanism in which an economic boom 
somewhere in the economy creates a currency appreciation. This makes homegrown commodities 
and goods more expensive and inevitably causes exports to become expensive for others to buy and 
imports cheaper. One of the circumstances in which we can detect the consequences of the Dutch 
Disease in South Sudan is its high level of tradable imports from neighbouring countries Uganda, 
Kenya and Ethiopia, and low level of exports, which makes trade asymmetrical.  
 
A currency appreciation occurred after independence when South Sudan doubled its oil revenue due 
to the expiration of the interim period where it shared its oil revenue with Sudan, and the booming 
oil prices, as seen in Diagram 4 above. It is therefore likely that the Dutch disease created a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The scope and page limitation of this paper does not allow me to conduct an extensive macro-economic analysis of 
the economy of South Sudan to analyse the effects of the Dutch Disease on the national economy, and I will therefore 
asses its theoretical mechanisms. 	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currency appreciation, which ‘crowded out’ the few but nonetheless existing industries, as the rising 
commodity prices squeezes profit in manufacturing and thus erode national competiveness, 
resulting in decreasing demand for home-produced goods, lover production and growth, and 
increases import. On the other hand, as Morris et al, (2011a) argues, the effects might also be due to 
the limited industrialisation of the area in the first place. 
 
The Dutch Disease is reversible via strategic growth enhancing policies. Regardless, these policies 
require strong institutions and political willingness amongst the ruling coalition. A willingness that 
might not be present due to the clientalistic-patronage around natural resource rent, combined with 
the low institutional quality of the state. In conclusion, it is not the possibility of Dutch Disease that 
threatens, rather, it is the lack of institutional quality and capacity as well as political willingness to 
remedy the illness via growth enhancing policies if and when if arrives. 
 
Due to monetary and fiscal mismanagement (such as the old trick of printing more money) South 
Sudan is at the moment experiencing excessive inflation. The exchange rate of the South Sudanese 
Pound (SSP) is therefore depreciating and not appreciating. The economy of South Sudan is 
therefore not in good shape; inflation, low oil export and revenue, and the excessive import of 
tradables that together constitute the economy which finances the clientalistic political settlement is 
under pressure12. 
 
In conclusion, this section has argued that South Sudan is suffering from the resource curse. It 
depicted how volatility of income creates an instable macro-economy where available resource 
rents are spend rather than saved and invested. It argued that Dutch disease is likely to ‘crowded 
out’ local industries and lead to deindustrialisation in the few existing industries. Last, it argued that 
the rentier nature of the state creates a political culture of clientalistic patronage focused on rent 
seeking that weakens state institutions and governance. In consequence, resource plenty amplified 
rent seeking and therefore reduced political focus on fiscal and industrial policies, which eventually 
increases the dependence on natural resources. This system additionally prevents the political elite 
from taking the right measures against the resource curse, and therefore, the resource curse in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 During my stay in Juba in March 2015, only the Bank of South Sudan had access to US Dollars. Short after our 
 departure South Sudan ran out of Dollars, and they were only to be found on the black market. 
	   	   	  	  
	   67	  
case is closely connected to the institutional capacity of the country. 
 
As argued in Chapter three, resource plenty can be a blessing if resource rents are deployed to 
enhance “productive capacities and economic diversification” (Buur et al, 2013: 28) and therefore 
does not necessary lead to diseases or curses. However, after scrutinising the political economy of 
South Sudan it becomes evident that there is no optimism that resource will lead to social and 
economic development in the near future. The following section will analyse how the long halt in 
oil production affected the political economy and particularly the ruling coalition of the young state. 
 
6.3. Observing through the lens of the Political Settlement 
The thesis has so far explained that the clientalistic patronage logic is dominant in and around the 
state. It also argued that army generals founded these practices during the wars prior to secession, 
which are now continued in SPLM/A through rent seeking in and around the state apparatus 
financed by the natural resource endowment. The coming political settlement analysis additionally 
provides a lens through which we can understand how and why this praxis takes place, and it will 
allow us to comprehend its role in the breakdown of the young state and nation. 
As explained in the Analytical Framework Mushtaq Khan, a political settlement is defined as a 
sustainable balance between the distribution of political power and benefits in a society, also coined 
compatibility of power and institutions. This is vital according to Khan, as he suggests that if 
powerful groups are not satisfied with their share of the pie, they will seek to change it (Khan, 
2010: 4). This suggests that the breakdown of the state and nation of South Sudan can be explained 
as a collapse of the existing political settlement, and moreover, the failing peace processes that 
followed can be viewed as a process of negotiations over the forthcoming political settlement. 
As we have seen, by the time of independence South Sudan doubled its oil revenue and was a 
wealthy country (De Waal, 2015: 3). As a consequence, South Sudan’s “political marketplace” was 
becoming incredibly expensive, as political and military stakeholders aimed to get a share of the pie 
and equilibrium of the political settlement: 
“By the time of independence, the South Sudanese “political marketplace” was so 
expensive that the country’s comparatively copious revenue was consumed by the 
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military-political patronage system, with almost nothing left for public services, 
development or institution building”  (De Waal, 2014a: 348) 
Buying allegiance in order to secure peace was a necessary strategy after the signing of the 
CPA’s were signed in 2005, because as described by Khan, conflict or threats of force are 
applied as leverage in negotiations of equilibrium. Therefore, the Government bought loyalty 
and incorporated the many dispersed Southern militias before their allegiances were sold to 
Khartoum, as well as they doubled the wages of all SPLA troops, twice. (This illustrated in 
the graph below) The increasing quantity of troops of the SPLA was additionally a strategy of 
President Salva Kiir to deter potential aggression from Sudan after the CPA’s were secured. 
The (regional) Government hereby attempted to buy monopoly of the means of violence 
during the Interim period, in order to ensure independence would become a reality in the 
coming referendum. 
 
  
 
 
 
Diagram 5. Illustrates the SPLA force around independence. (Source De Waal, 2014a: 356). 
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As a consequence the market place around the political settlement was becoming very expensive. 
So, despite high income this left little room for public spending on health and education for the 
“common man” elaborated below: 
 “We have all these money of the oil but they were embezzled by the people in power - the 
common man never benefited. We had between 20 to $30 billion in the six years from 
2005 to 2011- oil only. That was 50% of the oil. Add to that the national budget for South 
Sudan because it was still part of Sudan, there's a national budget that allocates funds for 
South Sudan. Add to that bilateral aid from friendly countries, donors who were vey 
generous at that time. Add to that the multi donor trust fund where Denmark and the rest 
of the countries were involved. All this money, where is it? The resources were there, the 
problem is you elect a leadership that had no vision of what to do for the country” (Lam 
Akol, 2015 interview: 467-478). 
 
As reflected by Lam Akol the people hardly benefitted in terms of social and economic 
development. However, the process created equilibrium and as a consequence the Interim period 
was largely peaceful as oil revenue ensured a clientalistic political settlement with enough for 
everybody. In conclusion, a sustainable balance between the distribution of political power and 
benefits were created through formal and informal institutions of Southern Sudan. President Kiir’s 
strategy of deterring Sudan and gaining independence succeeded, and sovereign South Sudan came 
into being 9th of July 2011, and the political settlement was in this process sustained and 
reproduced. 
 
The break down of the state and nation 
As seen, GOSS doubled its oil revenue after independence and was putting it to use. However, 
Sudan who had lost their total oil revenue wanted a share and demanded South Sudan to pay in 
order to use the pipelines running through Sudan to Port Sudan. The young and oil rich GOSS 
decided to bring Sudan to its knees and pause the entire national oil production (De Waal, 2014a). 
However, the pause ended up lasting sixteen months, until April 2013. Moreover, when oil 
production eventually resumed the quantity and crude prices had dropped and the revenues 
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stemming from oil decreased. This created a situation where the young rentier-state ran out of 
money, and despite expensive foreign loans, the equilibrium of the expensive clientalistic political 
settlement could no longer be sustained. In other words, there was no longer enough for everybody. 
As a consequence, President Kiir in July 2013 sacked his greatest rival for Precedency – Vice 
President Riek Manchar along with the entire cabinet (African Confidential 2013). Salva Kiir 
additionally cancelled the SPLM party Convention scheduled for May 2013, in which a Party 
Chairman and President candidate for the 2015 Presidential election were to be elected. This was 
not without consequences: 
“The leaked AU Inquiry found that throughout 2013, he had been warned by advisors 
that he was sowing the seeds of rebellion. His exclusion of opponents from power and 
his refusal to allow for the reform of SPLM mechanisms to allow for free and fair 
elections to the party leadership were creating unbearable pressure in the political 
system” (African Confidential 2015). 
 
The disequilibrium of the political settlement combined with the President’s attempt to retain in 
power and keep opponents outside power, influence and resources deteriorated the political 
settlement throughout 2013 and eventually led to its collapse in December 2013 when Salva Kiir 
accused Riek Manchar of staging a coup, and Riek Manchar fled Juba allegedly in a storm of gun 
shots. Due to the close affiliation of the SPLM and SPLA the political crisis the same night spilled-
over into the SPLA but in accordance to ethnic lines, when “SPLA soldiers killed Nuer civilians” 
(Pinaud, 2014: 193). Alex De Waal explains: 
 
“When the conflict broke out it immediately took on an ethnic dimension, and it did so 
not because these ethnic groups hate each other, or that intrinsically opposed to each 
other, but because the way in which the money has been shared out, and the constituency 
has been build by the members of the elite was ethnic” (De Waal in Al jazeera ‘Fault 
lines 2015). 
 
Lam Akol moreover explicates the neutral relations between tribes, a matter often neglected by 
Western media as they tend blame ethnic strive for the conflict: 
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“It is not the question of no tribes fighting each other, they don't except in the cases of 
other a land dispute, question of borders or cattle rustling - I want to take your cattle; 
you want to take mine, like that. But that they fight for political reasons is not there - it is 
only when they are recruited by the elites for their own purpose. It is very important to 
note that point” (Lam Akol, 2015 interview: 534-538). 
 
In conclusion, although the conflict is not caused by identity politics it is a man made catastrophe 
that led to grave suffering amongst the people. It claimed tens of thousands lives, internally 
displaced 1,6 million in South Sudan, caused 600,000 to fled to neighbouring countries and left 4,6 
million people severely food insecure (UN News Centre, 2015). As depicted, the humanitarian 
crisis has roots in the mismanagement of the political economy. Lam Akol reflects on the 
governance of his young country and express: “they are not different from the North, what is the 
difference? They say, oppressor has no colour” (Lam Akol. Interview, 484-85), Deng Bol reflects;  
“…we have turned against each other…” (Deng Bol Arui Bol, interview: 97), while I choose to end 
this section on a more positive note: “The army might be tearing itself and the country apart, but the 
people of South Sudan are not” (Johnson, 2014b: 8). 
 
Chicken games 
As argued in Chapter three, Sub-Saharan African developing states often neither posses monopoly 
on the means of violence nor political legitimacy of their state and nation. In such cases statehood is 
an external representation rather than an empirical reality. Dietrich Jung thus argues that the 
developing state often functions as ‘controlled anarchy’ and not a modern state. This pattern of 
controlled anarchy fit South Sudan during the time of equilibrium. Nevertheless, the collapse of the 
political settlement deteriorated and terminated the ‘control’ and unleashed ‘anarchy’ within the 
political settlement. The armed struggle between SPLM and SPLM-IO can according to Khan’s 
political settlement approach be coined ‘a game of chicken’, which is a competition about 
capabilities to ‘hold power’ and dominate the conflict in order to obtain desired equilibrium. This is 
supported by Douglas H. Johnson who have studied, written and participated in previous peace 
processes in South Sudan, and argues that crisis in South Sudan comprise a struggle for power in 
SPLM that “reignited factional fighting within SPLA, in December 2013” (Johnson, 2014a: 167). 
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Also De Waal argue “The dispute in the SPLM was about who would be in the top. There is no 
political agenda above power" (De Wall, in ‘Fault Lines’ documentary Aljazeera America). 
 
It has to be noted that GOSS and the SPLM/A-IO during the time of writing for the first time since 
the outbreak of the war in December 2013 signed a peace accord on the 20 month long conflict13. 
The peace accord was facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority and on Development (IGAD) 
the regional trade block of East Africa. Riek Manchar followed by President Salva Kiir both signed 
the peace accord, and the state is now in an additional 30-month interim period, once again aiming 
to build a transitional government of national unity. It is not the job of social scientists to predict the 
future, however, I will take the opportunity to continue my political settlement analysis with the 
latest accessible information. 
 
This peace accord signifies the end of the ‘game of chicken’ the two leaders have played since 
Manchar was sacked as Vice President in July 2013 and the outbreak of the intra-state war in 
December the same year, which for long was a stalemate. This therefore might be the first real step 
towards the creation of a new political settlement of the young country – or a next step in the 
evolution of the former. Riek Manchar is once again second in command in GOSS as he resumed to 
his position of Vice President. Mentioned in the accord is a police force that will govern the oil 
fields. This suggests GOSS will increase oil exports and increase oil revenue from the 160 000 
barrels produced daily. As we have seen in the above national oil revenue is central in the creation 
and evolution of the political settlement, as it accounts for the main source of income, and therefore 
is crucial in the clientalistic political settlement. Moreover, it is additionally necessary now, as 
allegiance from SPLM/A-IO splinter groups must be ensured for the peace accord to function and a 
political settlement to form. In sum, the peace accord might be the first step towards a new political 
settlement in South Sudan; however, it remains to be seen whether the political willingness as well 
as the economic means are present to carry it out. 
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  The peace accord was signed August 27th 2015. 
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Conclusion of Chapter six 
Chapter six began by explaining how a Southern elite was shaped by commanders of the SPLA via 
war predation during Sudan’s second civil war. It then elaborated how the elites currently are 
sustained and reproduced in clientalist patronage networks in the political settlement, which are 
financed through natural resource endowments, in particular crude oil. It therefore found that rent 
seeking was important in the former political settlement, as well as it might have been a central 
factor for the desire for secession and becoming a sovereign state. When investigating the macro-
economy of South Sudan, it was pointed out that the economy is still suffering from the 
consequences of the oil halt lasting from January 2012 until April 2013, which left the national 
budgets virtually without income and therefore indebted the otherwise wholesome economy of the 
country. It was then illuminated that South Sudan as a consequence ran out of money.. Moreover, 
the empty state coffers created a situation in which the state was unable to maintain its expensive 
clientalistic political settlement, which explains why President Kiir sacked his entire cabinet and 
Deputy in command Riek Manchar, not being blissfully unaware it would have consequences. 
Arguably, this led to the collapse of the existing political settlement and kick started a political 
conflict in the SPLM top, which immediately spiralled into the SPLA following the ethnic lines of 
the two men, President Salva Kiir who is ethnic Dinka and Riek Manchar ethnic Nuer, and began 
what we can define as an intra-state war. It was underscored how causes behind the intra-state war 
is to be found in the political economy of the country following the oil halt and lack of resources to 
constitute the excessive clientalistic political settlement, and only secondly is a matter of ethnicity. 
The analysis of Chapter six in conclusion declares that a peace accord has been signed by both 
GOSS and Riek Manchar’s rebel movement SPLM-IO, but it additionally argued that it remains to 
be seen whether this is the beginning of the coming political settlement or simply a continuation of 
the game of chicken and holding power between the two rivalling gentlemen. The humanitarian 
price of the political crisis that turned into an intra state war, is paid by the people. However, it was 
evident that the economy of war has driven the economy to its knees. A low production and export 
of oil, the low oil prices and the high oil transport creates very little oil revenue to the rentier 
economy that derives 98 percent of its national budget from oil earnings. I will hereby argue that 
weak institutions in the embryonic state, low political willingness and more importantly the 
expensive clientalistic political settlement has created an environment compliant to the resource 
curse. For instance, the analysis argued that volatility of income creates an instable macro-economy 
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where available resource rents are spend rather than saved and invested. Also, it reflected how 
Dutch disease is likely to ‘crowded out’ local industries and lead to deindustrialisation remaining 
industries. Last, it argued that GOSS has been unable to take the needed political measures against 
the Resource Curse because the clientalistic political settlement prey on the natural resource rent. In 
consequence, resource plenty amplified rent seeking and therefore reduced political focus on fiscal 
and industrial policies, which eventually increases the dependence on natural resources. Also, the 
analysis portrayed that South Sudan has a little industry and production, which might be an effect of 
the Dutch Disease from previous commodity surges, and which makes import of tradable from 
neighbouring countries cheaper than national production, and export more expensive for others to 
buy. In conclusion, there is no optimism that resource endowment will lead to social and economic 
development of South Sudan in the near future. It therefore became evident that the role of 
resources played a crucial role in the breakdown of the state and nation after independence. 
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Chapter 7: Concluding discussion 
 
 
7.1. Shake-‘n-bake: a taste of Eurocentric bias 
Hansen and Stepputat brilliantly argue that we cannot escape the modern state and therefore doing 
so is unnecessary: “the state and modern governance is not something one can be for or against as 
such, for the simple reason that we cannot escape it” (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 9). However, the 
way in which we approach and conceptualise the modern state should and does matter. I will in the 
following pages take up some of the ideas, paradoxes and critiques embarked upon throughout the 
dissertation and discuss them in a wider format than previously permitted. 
What Dietrich Jung refers to when he warns against the normativity of the state-building blueprint, 
is a critique of the assumption that the process and development of European state formation is 
viable in whichever socio-economic and cultural context. This notion entails that a contingent 
process can be copy-pasted and transferred into a structural and institutional set-up earlier referred 
to as the Amo shake-‘n-bake recipe is hence a Eurocentric bias. The framework is built on the 
universality that human communities are best governed through the structures of the state, and the 
notion that the state “always already inhabits specific features, functions and forms of government” 
(Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 7). Although we have seen time and time again, and latest in this very 
paper, that this universality of the state remains inconsistent with existing and empirical statehood 
of developing states the universality of the modern state continue to be the framework in which we 
measure the developing state and for which we strive. And so, despite the imperfect realities of 
states we continue to “reproduce the imagination of the state as the great enframer of our lives” 
(Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 37). 
We can uncover this bias if we study the language we apply to describe the developing state. The 
terminologies we use to define developing states in many cases are ‘fragile’, ‘weak’, and even 
‘failing’ or ‘collapsed’. The applied terminology suggests that the blueprint fails as norm for 
developing states, simply because it is unfit with its socio-economic reality of ‘this type of state’. Is 
it possible that it is time to redefine standards of statehood, abandon the Eurocentric Amo shake-‘n-
bake universality of modern governance and statehood to more realistic and fitting circumstance of 
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the developing state? 
Hagmann and Péclard subsequently come to terms with this discourse of state failure in “Negoating 
Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa” arguing that the discourse of ‘state 
failure’ and ‘weakness’ in reality hinders social science from investigating and understanding how 
statehood takes out empirically separate from the European nation-state (Hagmann & Péclard 
2010). In sum, I suggest that the utopian imaginary of the state as well as the blueprint universality 
of the notion of state formation has created an academic discourse too centred on the flaws, faults 
and defects of developing states. Echoing Abrams, this discourse unfortunately takes away focus 
from discovering empirical realities of statehood, which especially have consequences for the 
developing state that is forced to juggle between contradictory logics and ‘realities’ as elaborated in 
Chapter five. And therefore, the universality of statehood and state formation time and time again 
suggest and dictate via global governance, policies and process that are unfit with the socio-
economic reality of developing countries. 
With this in mind, it seems as if social science has been blinded by its own normative and utopian 
conceptualisations regarding the developing state. In hindsight, was it naive to believe that a 
Weberian good-governance state could be built in amidst the African bush of Southern Sudan? 
Most likely, yes. To comprehend how come the state project in South Sudan broke down so soon 
after independence this thesis set out to investigate the blueprint of the insertion of the nation-state. 
Within this process it critiqued the state universality and the state building blueprint, and instead 
proposed that the clientalistic political settlement is a better framework to conceptualise how 
governance and statehood in reality is negotiated in South Sudan. Mushtaq Khan writes (accidently 
prior to the birth of an independent South Sudan), that all developing states are based on a 
clientalistic political settlement and therefore by definition contrasts the Weberian state. He argues: 
“the goal of a Weberian ‘good governance’ state is simply not achievable in developing 
countries as an immediate goal. More importantly, if the goal is to identify the most 
appropriate institutional reform strategies that can be implemented and deliver results, 
the Weberian good governance model is not even a good guide to incremental policy 
priorities” (Khan, 2010: 5). 
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One would assume that social science’s raison d’etre is to assist in shaping the social world the best 
possible way. On the other hand, academics tend to disagree amongst each other to an extend only 
beaten by politicians. And so, the universals of good governance remain. 
 
7.2.Negotiating statehood 
The dissertation has explained that ‘the state’ outside European borders is a relative new 
phenomenon, usually instigated in the 20th century, and shaped in a Western imaginary. Giving the 
adolescence of statehood combined with the socio-economic challenges faced by most developing 
SSA countries it is understandable that young post-colonial states are “struggling to define and 
identify their statehood vis-à-vis other social institutions and actors” (Andersen et al., 2007: 7). In 
comparison, South Sudan as a sovereign is only four years old, and as we have seen, is still at an 
embryonic stage of statehood. South Sudan is therefore not merely struggling to define its identity 
in relation to other social institutions i.e. the tribal and the elitist logics on its path towards good 
governance. As argued, the idea of sovereignty was not merely based on the sentiment caused by 
the long conflict and suffering caused by the central Government. Additionally, it was the strategy 
that independence would increase oil revenue and ease the access to it. Statehood thus partly 
originated as a rent seeking strategy amongst Southern elites, and the state can therefore be viewed 
as an arena for Southern elites to acquire access to natural resource rents. One is therefore left to 
wonder whether the state of South Sudan a mere façade? A façade where statehood serves a 
stepping-stone for the elitist self-enrichment via the clientalistic political settlement? 
 
State formation, argues Jung, is a long-term and open-ended process. It is moreover an incredibly 
bloody and war prone process of social transformation, one that South Sudan has only recently 
instigated. According to the UN, South Sudan is entering statehood as one of the most under-
developed countries in the world (UNDAF). The role of resource endowment came to be key for the 
insurgence and secession, but as natural resources increased the excessive clientalist political 
settlement it ended up triggering armed conflict rather than social and economic development. The 
war-torn people of South Sudan who for generation suffered and fought for freedom and equality 
have yet again drawn the short straw. The elites on the other hand, has been blessed with 
independence in the quest for rent seeking: “We have all these money of the oil but they were 
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embezzled by the people in power - the common man never benefited” (Lam Akol, Interview: 467-
68). One cannot help but wonder whether independence was a means to an end for an elite to secure 
personal interests? However, what history has shown us since Chevron first discovered oil in Sudan 
in 1978 is that resource endowment has been a blessing for those on top of the chain, yet remain a 
curse for those for the many. 
 
Another central reason why it was possible to secede was the success of SPLM managed throughout 
history to manipulate Western Governments and popular opinion (De Waal, 2014a), which resulted 
in their transformation from insurgency militia to an internationally recognised sovereign and 
number 195 UN member-state, and GOSS. During the birth of South Sudan – the youngest country 
in the world, donors, via the international community were enthusiastic to help South Sudan build a 
strong and compatible state. There were several reasons why the West was eager to participate in 
this immense yet risky process. Most important, I deem, was the lingering struggle and grave 
human suffering during one of Africa’s longest civil wars, which from the perspective of bystanders 
seemed to occur as a consequence of religious and racial factors between the central government 
and the South. As a consequence, Western sentiment was focused around the marginalised Christian 
population of Southern Sudan. This was politicised by the SPLM/A and gave them leverage (De 
Waal, 2014a 352). Nevertheless, as Lam Akol expressed to me after we finished the interview the 
“SPLM was never an democratic organisation”. 
 
This sentiment for the South was additionally where I began my long lasting flirt with South Sudan. 
The narrative of injustice and suffering combined with the yarn for sovereignty was unfolded. Like 
the Western Governments who supported SPLM before and during the Interim period leading 
towards Independence, I anticipated nationalism, ethnicity, democracy, liberty and social and 
economic development to be key for GOSS. As a consequence, I expected these elements, 
especially around ‘the nation’, ‘the people’ and ethnicity, to be key, and become my unit of analysis 
through my investigation of comprehending why we are witnessing a breakdown of the state and 
nation. Nonetheless, neither the role of ethnicity or nationalism proved to be vital, and in the end I 
therefore came to focus on the state. In fact, once I began conducting my research it came to my 
attention that the conflict was about power and access to resources, which is best explained 
applying the lens of the clientalist-patron political settlement. This is not to say that ethnicity and 
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nationalism does not play a role, because for the identity politics of people of South Sudan, those 
elements remain central and my bias did not fail me completely. However, from the perspective of 
PSA ethnicity is coupled to the conflict as resources is distributed through the clientalist-patron 
political settlement via ethnic lines. And subsequently, after the collapse of the political settlement 
that materialised in war in December 2013, human right abuses taking place were thus conducted 
along the ethnic lines in accordance to the constellation of the collapsed political settlement. This 
additionally sparked revenge killings on other groups and the role of ethnicity came, especially 
Western media, to be perceived as the cause mechanism when in fact it was an effect and a 
scapegoat of conflicts over power and resources. In conclusion, it is my opinion that ethnicity is 
imperative and must be addressed in state and nation building in South Sudan; however, in this 
dissertation it came to be a side product and not the unity of analysis. This process of realisation 
reflects Bateson’s Feedback Model and illustrates how research is a constant process consisting of 
realisations and epiphanies through which researchers increase and deepen knowledge. 
 
If we take a step back, the political settlement approach can also help explain the conflict between 
the South and North. The empirical data states how the South never believed in the unity of Sudan, 
but more importantly, the South was marginalised and so was its elites. The constellation of 
institutions and elites did not benefit the South, who most likely wanted a bigger piece of the pie. 
Had the chiefs (the closest we come to Southern elites at this point) of the rural South been 
compensated prior and during the beginning of Chevron’s presence in Southern Sudan, the 
Southern militia might not have taken arms against Chevron in 1984, and SPLM/A might never 
have come in to existence in the constellation we know it. As seen, the yarn for separation was 
always present in the South, and the conflict is not fostered by petroleum only, but is certainly 
sparked by it. 
 
Or simply sheer political rivalry? 
As noted by now, the breakdown of the state and nation of South Sudan occurring in December 
2013 has been explained with Mashtaq Khan’s political settlement approach. Central in the analysis 
was the circumstance in which GOSS ran out of money after the 16 months oil halt, which caused 
the cabinet as well as the Vice President their positions. However, this approach does not explain 
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the additional element of personal rivalry between the two leading figures of the SPLM up to the 
collapse of the political settlement. As stated in Chapter four, Riek Manchar planned to run for 
Presidency in 2015, which required being elected as party chairman at the party convention in May 
2013. And so, the two comrades were competing for Presidency in the period leading up the 
collapse of the political settlement, which adds an element of personal rivalry amongst the two. 
Also, it reflects that conflict began in the political top six months prior to the ethnic based violence 
in December (Africa Confidential, 2015). I therefore find, that in order to comprehend the collapse 
of the political settlement we must view the political settlement approach in relation to the 
competitiveness of the President and his deputy. This entails noting that the Party Convention 
scheduled for May 2013 was canalled by the President, not won. Also, he chose to sack his Deputy 
and hereby break the equilibrium instead of keeping him part of the ruling coalition. In sum, 
although the state was running out if money it was the decision of the President to sack Manchar 
rather than keeping him that ‘triggered the gun’ and led to the collapse of the political settlement. 
And as the democratic rules were paused and President election postponed during the time of war it 
bought the President yet another term as head of state. 
 
Maintaining the myth of the state 
The above-mentioned eruptions within the elites were seen to have severe consequences for the 
people, and therefore pose a threat to the myth of the nation-state. Resembling the nation, which is 
imagined as a comradeship so is the nation-state. As explained previously, the imagination and 
myth of the state occurs in the languages applied by the state in its daily interactions with its 
subjects. On that note, the people of South Sudan are becoming aware of and tired of the rampant 
corruption, taking place in the state. Rehan reflects how the people participated in the struggle 
leading to independence: “A lot of people contribute and then just only few get a benefit from it” 
(Maror Rehan, interview: 438). Therefore it could be argued that the clientalistic political 
settlements, which mainly benefit the elites, might be jeopardizing the comradeship connected to 
the myth and imagination of the state. This is reflected in the sentiment that the government “the 
ruling people are not different from the North” as the young state celebrated its fourth birthday in 
the mist of civil war, Lam Akol elaborates: 
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“corruption divided the people more. There is a feeling now that the ruling people are 
not different from the North; they're copying the same behavior. There's collusion, the 
greed, ignoring others, all these things. People are beginning to say, 'What is the 
difference, it is only the color?' And they say oppressor has no color, it can be white, it 
can be black, it can be yellow, and it can be anything. So this are really kind of things 
that need to be addressed as soon as possible” (Lam Akol, interview, 482-87), 
 
This reflects that the ordinary people who contributed in the wars remain to benefit from 
independence, and therefore is questioning the outcomes of the imagined community they were 
promised with the inception of statehood. The inadequate process of state and nation-building 
therefore challenges the imagination of the state. On the other hand, Southern ‘nation-building’ was 
less complicated prior to the CPA’s as having one common enemy shaped the communion amongst 
the Southern tribes. In sum, with the demise of the enemy the focus of the elites has been centred on 
rent seeking, and thus nation building has been forsaken. The juxtaposition between the elites and 
the people in conclusion reflects the African proverb: 
“When two elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled” 
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Conclusion 
 
The dissertation that now is coming to an end, set out to understand the reasons behind the 
breakdown of the state and nation of South Sudan. In order to do so, it scrutinised the state building 
project of the modern statehood and the analysed the political settlement of the young country. Its 
findings as well as conclusions are presented in the coming section. 
 
The dissertation illustrated that modern statehood was attempted in South Sudan after independence 
in 2011, through the attempt of building a viable nation-state. It argued that the project was driven 
by GOSS who were assisted by the UNDP and bilateral donors. The paper hereby answers research 
question number two, which asks: How was (nation)state building pursued in South Sudan after the 
CPA/independence and who drove the project and how did the embryonic state fit the idea of the 
Westphalian state imaginary? It then depicted that two imagined communities coexist in South 
Sudan: the tribe and the nation-state. However, it reflected that only the tribe is legitimately 
anchored in the traditional local community. Therefore, despite the expectations of the modern state 
project, contradictory logics continue to exist in the world’s youngest state, these are: (1) the nation-
state logic, (2) the tribal logic, and (3) the client-patron network. It explained that the latter two 
propose a local social and distributive network parallel to the nation-state logic, from where their 
existence and effects are concealed as ‘public secrets’. Consequently, South Sudan has proven 
resilient against the logic provided by the modern state project, which haft left the nation-state logic 
nothing more than a blueprint and a façade of a viable state, whose empirical reality is based on 
negative sovereignty without real governance and state-ness. The analysis therefore argued that the 
modern state project and the good governance state building project was unfit with the empirical 
reality of South Sudan. In sum, modern statehood has failed to eliminate its competing and 
contradictory logics, and without intending to it ends up assisting them by being their normative 
reference and financial raison d’etre. This has created a negative spiral that hollows, dismantles and 
potentially threatens the survival of the state. 
 
This paper remained critical towards the strict interpretation of Weber’s ideal and legitimate 
governance, which has resulted in a political blueprint of statehood known as ‘the modern state’, and 
contends that consolidated states are built if Governments follows the democratic good governance 
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recipe of state building. It was hereby illustrated, that the state building ‘Amo ’shake’n’bake led by 
UN unintentionally has counteracted itself and herein has played a crucial role in the breakdown of 
the young state. In sum, the dissertation argued that the project of statehood fit the idea of the 
Westphalian state imaginary prescribed by the nation state logic, whereas the tribal and the client-
patron logic dominate the empirical reality of the state. 
 
In order to reply the third research question, which asks: How	  can	  we	  understand	  the	  role	  natural	  resources	   played	   in	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	   South	   Sudanese	   nation-­‐state	   project	   after	  independence?,	   it	   investigated	   the	  macro	   economy	  and	   the	  political	   settlement.	   It	   began	  by	  arguing	  how ruling coalition is sustained and reproduced in clientalist patronage networks in the 
political settlement are financed through natural resource endowments. It hereby found that rent 
seeking was crucial for the political settlement, and propose that it might have been a central factor 
for the desire for secession and becoming a sovereign state. It hereby replies research question 
number on, which asks: how was the state and nation envisioned before and during the second civil 
war of Sudan by the Sudan People Liberation Movement?, as it suggests rent seeking and access to 
resource rents have been crucial. 
 
When investigating the macro-economy of South Sudan, it was pointed out that the economy is still 
suffering from the consequences of the oil halt lasting from January 2012 until April 2013. This 
macro economic mismanagement indebted the country that eventually ran out of money and 
President Kiir was unable to maintain its expensive clientalistic political settlement. As a 
consequence, he sacked his entire cabinet and Deputy in command Riek Manchar, which led to the 
collapse of the existing political settlement, and kick started a political conflict in the SPLM 
leadership and began an intra-state war with an ethnic dimension. The paper emphasised that causes 
behind the intra-state war is to be found in the political economy of the country following the oil 
halt and lack of resources to constitute the excessive clientalistic political settlement, and only 
secondly is a matter of ethnicity. 
It was moreover argued that the oil halt and the economy of war have driven the rentier economy to 
its knees. It was explained that volatility of income creates an instable macro-economy where 
available resource rents are spend rather than saved and invested. Also, it reflected how Dutch 
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disease ‘crowded out’ local industries and lead to deindustrialisation remaining industries. Last, it 
argued that GOSS has been unable to take the needed political measures against the Resource Curse 
because the clientalistic political settlement prey on the natural resource rent. 
Al in all, the dissertation argued the breakdown of the young state is caused by the failure of the 
modern state project, as the political settlement is made up by the clientalic-patronage ruling 
coalition. In sum the dissertation reflects the marvellous Danish proverb ‘når krybben er tom bides 
hestene14’, and therefore suggests, that we ditch modern statehood and insert a gift oracle. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The proverb is in English less precise as it translates into ‘when poverty comes in at the door love flies out the 
window’. 
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